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I. INTRODUCTION
The construction which is currently in progress in the City of Newark is unique
for one reason. Over 30% of the skilled craft journeymen are from mi-
nority groups and an additional 300 minority trainees are working side-by-
side with the journeymen four days a week and receiving off-site skills and
remedial training at a community-operated training school on $1 billion
worth of construction projects. This is in sharp contrast to the situation
just four years ago where all skilled construction work, with almost no
exceptions, was done by white journeymen who were referred out of
union halls with virtually all-white memberships.
The cause for this change was the development, of a strong, effective,
affirmative action program pursuant to Executive Order 11,246 by the New-
ark minority community with the assistance of various government bodies.
This is now commonly known as the Newark Plan. This article will de-
scribe the development of the Newark Plan, the applicable law, and its ap-
plication for other cities.
II. HISTORY OF THE NEWARK PLAN
On the evening of July 14, 1967, a violent urban riot erupted in the City of
Newark. The Lilly Commission' cited the controversy which had been raging
concerning the construction of the New Jersey college of Medicine and Den-
tistry (hereinafter referred to as the Medical School) on a 150-acre Urban
Renewal Plot in Newark's almost totally black Central Ward as one of the
1. GOVERNOR'S SELECT COMMISSION ON CIVIL DIsoRDER REPORT FOR ACTION, STATE
OF NEW JERSEY 12-15 (1967) [hereinafter cited as REPORT FOR AcTION].
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two major controversies 2 which sparked the riots.8 A major community de-
mand with respect to this construction project was that jobs be provided for
minority Newark residents. This demand had been voiced by the minority
community with respect to numerous public construction projects undertaken
over the preceding ten years.4 The continued presence of all-white construc-
tion crews in Newark, whose population was over sixty percent non-white 5
was still a major issue. The Lilly Commission specifically recommended that
"the Federal, State, county and municipal governments should require and
enforce effective integration of labor on publicly financed construction proj-
ects."6
Following the urban uprising in the summer of 1967, the Newark Com-
munity7 took up the Medical School controversys with renewed vigor.9 The
2. The other known as the Parker-Callaghan controversy involved what the minor-
ity community viewed as an outright political deal in an appointment made by the
Newark Board of Education. See REPORT FOR ACTIONq.
3. Some of the more fundamental causes of the riots included the following: one
in three Newarkers were on some form of public assistance; 14 percent of the labor
force was unemployed; another 25 percent was underemployed; Newark had 20,000
known drug users among its 380,000 residents. Its crime rate, venereal disease, and
infant mortality rates are among the highest in the nation. See Taylor, Newark:
Parasite Suburbs, 9 TRANSACrON SOCIAL SCI. AND MODERN SOCIETY No. 10 (1972).
In 1960, whites in Newark had a nearly two-to-one edge. By 1970, the white
population had dropped to 36.6 percent white, the black population rose to
54.2 percent with Puerto Ricans making up the remaining 9 percent. The
flight of whites from Newark during the decade added to a net migration of
106,500 equal to four of every ten white Newarkers living in the city in 1960.
4. In 1963, racial confrontations arose in relation to the construction of a new
Barringer High School in Newark. Conforte, Newark: Ghetto or City, 9 TRANs-
ACTION SOCIAL SC. AND MODERN SOCIETY 36 (1972).
5. See note 3 supra.
6. REPORT FOR AcTION 6.
7. The term community, as used herein, operated on two levels: on one level, the
community was comprised of a small number of individuals who were interested in the
problem of integrating the construction trades. They negotiated with the State of New
Jersey concerning the construction of the Medical School after the riots. On the
other level Newark Community refers to a coalition of community leaders, minority
tradesmen, young lawyers and many others. The make-up of the group changed
and evolved over the period of the controversy. The Greater Newark Urban Coa-
lition formalized the leadership element of the coalition into the Greater Newark
Affirmative Action Coalition. In the later years the coalition even included lower level
staff people from HEW and the State of New Jersey. This coalition attempted to sup-
port the work of those working at the other level, when an organization which had
political clout was needed.
8. There were other issues involved in these negotiations such as housing for resi-
dents displaced by the Medical School, as advocated by the Newark Area Planning
Association, which are not the subject of this article.
9. Negotiations began with the State of New Jersey, the builder of the school. The
ensuing negotiations were viewed by Paul Ylvasaker, then Director of the New Jersey
Department of Community Affairs, as a "process of collective bargaining between the
present power structure and the Negroes ... a process not dissimilar to labor bargain-
ing with management." Duhl, Newark Community or Chaos, A Case Study of the Medi-
cal School Controversy, 5 J. APPLIED BEHAVIORAL ScL 537, 561 n.7 (1969).
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position of the Community was bolstered with the designation of the site of
the Medical School and the area surrounding it as a demonstration area
under the Model Cities Act.10
In December 1967, the community filed an administrative complaint with
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)"I alleging among
other things the failure by the Newark Housing Authority12 to provide for
citizen participation in the project decision making. This complaint marked
the culmination of community pressure on every level of government to
meet their demands: HUD funded the Urban Renewal necessary to clear the
land; the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) was to
fund the Medical School; the State of New Jersey was the builder of the
Medical School; the Newark Housing Authority was the local Urban Renewal
Agent; and the City government was granting the tax abatement.' 3
On January 10, 1968, HUD and HEW informed the State of New Jersey
The government negotiators represented positive power-the "legitimate" govern-
mental bodies that could create jobs by initiating public projects or en-
couraging private spending. The community negotiators on the other hand represented
only negative power-the power to destroy what the whites had built up. See also
Williams, Advocacy in Newark: The Medical School Controversy (1968) (unpublished
paper submitted for 3rd year thesis at Yale Law School). Mr. Williams, who was a
major figure in the post-riot negotiations, felt that the control of land in the pre-
dominantly black Central Ward was the kind of power which blacks could use to
their benefit. The blacks could readily convert their negative power over the land
(power to stop construction) which the state needed, into positive power (power to
force concessions from the State which met a genuine community need). Id. at 10-18.
10. See Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3301
et seq. (1970). 42 U.S.C. § 3305(c) states:
That no Federal grant-aid program shall be considered to be carried out in
connection with such demonstration program unless it is closely related to the
physical and social problems in the area of the city covered by the program and
unless it can reasonably be expected to have a noticeable effect upon such
problems. The specific amount of any such grant shall take into account
the number and intensity of the economic and social pressures in the sections
of neighborhoods involved, such as those involving or resulting from popula-
tion density, poverty levels, unemployment rate, and degree of substandard
and dilapidated housing.
Furthermore, HUD's Model Cities Planning Requirements, section 1.7, states the follow-
ing:
Widespread citizen participation is a basic statutory requirement. Cities must
work closely with neighborhood residents in all phases of the formulation of
the plan as well as its execution. The process of involving residents in deci-
sion-making during the planning and program implementation should result in
a program that is responsive to their needs and recognizes and develops their
competence as individuals and citizens.
11. HUD, Administrative Complaint to Secretary Robert Weaver in Epperson v.
Housing Authority of City of Newark (1967), reproduced in E. JARMEL, PROBLEMS IN
THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR 11-14 (1972). See also Williams, supra
note 9.
12. Newark Housing Authority is the Urban Renewal Agent for the City of Newark.
13. See generally Williams, supra note 9.
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of new funding criteria for the Medical School construction. The seven re-
quirements included: "... suitable plans for employment of neighbor-
hood residents be made both in construction and operation of the [medical]
center."1
4
It was decided that the state, the federal government, the contractors,
the unions and the community should come together into a body desig-
nated as the "Review Council" to formulate a comprehensive affirmative
action plan which would cover all construction.' 5 The Review Council was
constituted of the following representatives: two from the State of New
Jersey, two from the local contractors associations, two from the unions,
and eight from the community; one HEW representative was given ex-officio
status.
At this point the State of New Jersey agreed to fund three agencies which
played a significant role in subsequent events. The first was the New
Jersey Contractor's Development Office. This office was set up to negotiate
sub-contracts from the prime contractors on the Medical School and in turn
assist various minority contractors in preparing the necessary prerequisites
to a large construction job. 16 The second was the Minority Group Journey-
man Referral Service (MGJRS), which was established to find, recruit and
refer the various minority journeymen in the area. The third was the
Joint Apprenticeship Program (JAC) which was established to recruit
and prepare minorities for entry into the apprenticeship programs pursuant
to the commitments elicited from the State.
The MGJRS sought to reach out to all the minority skilled workers in the
area and to organize them into a cohesive force. It did so by contacting
14. Letter from Robert C. Wood and Wilbur J. Cohen to Governor Richard I.
Hughes, January 10, 1968.
15. Three months of difficult negotiation ensued. Finally, the community won the
following concessions:
1. a review council, composed of state, federal, contractor, union and community
representatives, would be formed to define standards of compliance, conduct pre-award
reviews of projected manning tables, and coordinate compliance efforts;
2. increased efforts to recruit qualified minority craftsmen with direct hir-
ing by contractors to overcome anticipated union resistance;
3. enlarged apprenticeship classes in all trades;
4. establishment of apprenticeship program;
5. state to provide technical assistance and contract subsidies to enable minority
contractors to work on the project;
6. designation of a full time compliance officer in the Treasury Department to en-
force the above condition;
Agreements Reached Between Community and Government Negotiation Regarding
New Jersey College of Medicine and Dentistry and Related Matters, as amended April
30, 1968. Reproduced in Duhl, supra note 9, at n.20.
16. The record of the New Jersey Contractor's Development Office at 45 Branford
Place, Newark, New Jersey 17102, under the direction of Gurney Nelson, has been im-
pressive. I will forego any detailed discussion here.
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the minority contractors and obtaining lists of all the minority names from
the unions in the area. Once these individuals were contacted, word quickly
spread by the word of mouth.
It was not long before hundreds of minority journeymen were organized.
Most never had unions books, but worked on a hand to mouth basis-
working for non-union contractors, picking up odd jobs, and doing home
service work. Many were craftsmen in the 1940's before they migrated
from the South. At these MGJRS meetings, the community representa-
tives of the Review Council were able to learn just how discrimination in
the skilled trades worked. The journeymen themselves found the organiza-
tion useful in exchanging ideas and job possibilities.
MGJRS was also able to obtain legal assistance 17 to institute Title VII
actions against the unions when needed.' 8  JAC, on the other hand, at-
tempted to place its applicants with the various apprenticeship programs.
Again, although JAC met with very little success, it quickly learned how
the mechanisms of exclusions operated.
Construction on some temporary buildings began in 1968 but the prom-
ises of the State to encourage minority employment failed to materialize.' 9
As the result of community protest HEW finally notified the State20 on July
3, 1969, that HEW would not release any construction funds until the
state had indicated compliance with Executive Order 11,246 by adopting
procedures requiring bidders to submit projected manning tables. 2' Faced
with the possibility of losing all federal monies, the State moved quickly to
develop a plan which would meet federal requirements.
Long negotiations between the community and the various government
agencies finally culminated in agreement, 22 after which HEW approved the
17. The lawyers were attorneys at three offices: the Newark-Essex Joint Law Re-
form Project, a legal services office; the Community Legal Action Workshop, estab-
lished by the ACLU; and NAACP Legal Defense Fund.
18. Webb v. Hughes, Civil No. 1478-69 (D.N.J., filed Dec. 11, 1969); D'Meza v.
Shultz, Civil No. 1479-69 (D.N.J., filed Dec. 11, 1969). These actions were suits
against the State, the Secretary of Labor, the unions and contractors for violation of the
plaintiff's rights guaranteed by executive order and the fourteenth amendment. Webb
was voluntarily dismissed when the union involved admitted him to membership.
D'Meza is pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
19. See N.Y. Times, June 19, 1969, § 1, at 41, col. 1.
20. Letter from Robert Miller, Director of Contract Compliance of HEW to Gov-
ernor Richard J. Hughes, July 3, 1969.
21. Projected manning tables are lists prepared by a general contractor, broken
down by months and containing his best estimate of what his manpower requirement
will be for each trade for the life of the job. In the projected manning tables, the con-
tractor committed himself to a certain percentage of minority workers on the job. The
contractor also had to detail his efforts to obtain union cooperation in minority recruit-
ment and training programs.
22. This six point compromise plan called for:
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affirmative action program, and the State included it as an amendment to
the general conditions and instructions to bidders published for Phase II
construction on October 1, 1969.23 However, on November 26, 1969, the
contractors secured a temporary restraining order from the New Jersey
Superior Court to enjoin the State from opening bids.24
In March 1970, at the behest of the attorneys for the Federal Govern-
ment, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) of the United
States Department of Labor announced that it would hold hearings on the
extent of minority participation in the construction industry in Newark.2 5
On June 3, 1970, the hearing examiners announced their findings that mi-
norities were seriously under-utilized in the construction industry in New-
ark.2 6 In June, the Plan was revised for the ninth time to include the OFCC
1. Contractor to secure a union agreement which would specify the hiring and re-
ferral procedure to be followed until minority group workers were reasonably repre-
sented on the construction site on each phase.
2. Contractors were required to develop manning tables which projected the size of
the prospective work force and identified the number of workers required for each
month by craft and race.
3. In the event a union was unable to provide a reasonable representation of mi-
nority group workers, contractors were to hire new workers on a one for one basis
from the regular union referral list and from a preferrential referral list of minority
workers recruited by the Minority Group Journeymen Referral Service and state em-
ployment service.
4. Contractors were charged with the responsibility of developing a journeyman
training program from minority group workers who lacked the experience to qualify
as and did not satisfy the age or education requirements to enter apprentice programs.
5. Apprenticeship programs which insured preferential hiring of minority workers
were to be developed.
6. Workers were to be qualified for employment only by experience, on-the-job tests,
or written or performance examinations.
23. See affidavit of Donald Burnstein, Contract Compliance Specialist, Office of
Civil Rights, Region I, HEW, filed in Essex County, District Council of Carpenters and
Millwrights v. Conforte and Eisele, Inc., 4 EPD 7574 (D.N.J. 1970).
24. Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1970). The action was insti-
tuted in the New Jersey Superior Court by three contractor associations alleging that
compliance with the plan would require them to breach their collective bargaining
agreements with their unions. The injunction against opening the bids lasted for over
a year, until December, 1970. The defendant State of New Jersey joined all of the
unions involved, the Department of Labor, HEW, HUD, and the community repre-
sentation on the Review Council. The federal defendants removed the case to the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.
25. 35 Fed. Reg. 4231 (1970). It is clear from the court's opinion in Joyce that
holding these hearings was absolutely essential to final judicial approval of the Plan.
320 F. Supp. 1284.
26. Some of the findings of these hearings were as follows:
Because of the exclusionary practices of some labor organizations in the Newark, New
Jersey area, there traditionally has been only a small number of minorities employed
in the construction trades. These exclusionary practices include:
1. Failure to admit minorities into membership.
2. Failure of the unions to refer minorities for employment, which has resulted in
large measure from granting of priority in referral to union members and to persons
who have had work experience under union contracts.
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findings. 27 The final version, which became known as the "Newark Plan,"
was approved by HEW as complying with Executive Order 11,246 on June
24, 1970.28 Pursuant to its opinion of December 29, 1970 in Joyce v.
McCrane,29 the federal district court in New Jersey dissolved the injunctions
against the opening of bids and approved the Plan in its entirety.
A. The Training Program
Since the inception of the idea of the affirmative action plan, the com-
munity made it clear that their highest priority was an effective training
mechanism which operated completely independent from the union struc-
ture to prepare minorities for union membership. After the victory in
Joyce, the community sought to make good on the State's prior commit-
ments to fund an independent, community-run training program because
years of experience had shown that the traditional union run apprenticeship
program was inadequate. The community's proposal called for a $1.4 mil-
lion grant for an eighteen-month period. When the State identified fund-
ing sources,30 the community gained the desired control over the training
program.
The Newark Construction Trades Training Corporation (NCTTC) was
established to serve two essential functions: outreach and training. The
3. Failure to admit minority group members in apprenticeship programs. 320 F.
Supp. at 1288.
The Newark city population is estimated at 400,000 persons, of which over 60 per-
cent are Negroes and 10 percent are Spanish surnamed Americans. In the section of
the city within and immediately surrounding the model Cities area, (which includes the
site of the Medical College facility) 84 percent of the population of approximately
100,000 persons is Negro and 10 percent is Spanish surnamed. The overall unemploy-
ment rate in Newark totals 9.1 percent while the Negro unemployment rate is 11.5
percent and the Spanish surnamed American unemployment rate approaches 13 percent.
Unemployment figures for the model cities area reveal that 12.4 percent of all Negroes
are unemployed and 19 percent of Spanish speaking persons are jobless.
Minorities have been excluded as members of construction trade unions and from
apprenticeship programs. For example, according to 1970 statistics, of the major con-
struction trade unions, two had no minority journeymen members, two more unions
representing four trades had less than 1 percent minority journeymen membership, and
two more unions had less than 2 percent minority journeymen membership. There had
also been exclusion of minorities from apprenticeship programs. See also Sub-Ap-
pendix A, p. 490 infra.
27. See Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284, 1287 (D.N.J. 1970).
28. Id. at 1287-88.
29. 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1970).
30. The State was to grant to NCTTC: $750,000 which was reimbursable from the
Secretary of Labor under the Manpower Development and Training Program, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2625 (1970); $100,000 from allocations to the State under the Emergency Employ-
ment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4871-83 (1973); $313,000 from the State's budget for regional
vocational schools 18A N.J.S.A. §§ 545-10 (1968); and the balance from the legislative
allocation to the New Jersey College of Medicine and Dentistry 18A N.J.S.A. §§ 64G-1
to 64G-31 (West Supp. 1973).
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outreach program set up two offices in strategic areas in Newark's Central
Ward. Advertising was done in the schools, the black newspapers and
on some of the black radio stations. The response was overwhelming.
Within the first six months of its establishment over 2,000 minorities
had registered with NCTTC to become trainees. The NCTTC outreach
program was set up and run by minorities to recruit minorities into a
minority-run training program. When jobs were available, word spread
quickly, and the fact that the applicant need not enter the hostile world
of a union hall eliminated the single most difficult factor in the process.
This was the essential difference between the NCTTC outreach program
and union efforts to comply with Title VII decrees.
With respect to training, the community had to develop remedial and
skills training for all trades covered by the plan. Consultants were hired
and shops were set up. Essex County College offered assistance with the
remedial training program.
A number of trades became concerned, however, that they had little or
no control over the training of large numbers of individuals who would even-
tually enter the trade and probably their own union. As a result, these
unions approached NCTTC and proposed to run the training program
for them. NCTTC refused to give up overall control of program in light
of the unions' past track record, but agreements were reached with two
unions to date and the prospect for future agreements in the other trades
looks promising.
This, of course, is the best of both worlds. The unions are probably
the best qualified teachers of their trade. In addition, trainees trained out-
side of the union mechanism tend to cause antagonism on the job with
union members. The fact that the union is doing the training under
NCTTC auspices tends to relieve much of the tension on the job-site be-
tween the membership and the trainees."'
B. The Department of Justice
Shortly after the decision in loyce, the community again heard rumblings
to the effect that the unions would do everything in their power to sabotage
the plan. Among a number of separate strategies used to combat this situ-
ation, the community met with officials of the United States Department of
Justice and asked that several of the unions be investigated with an eye
toward bringing Title VII actions.
In March 1971, the Department of Justice filed a large Title VII action
31. To date over 300 trainees are enrolled in NCITC programs receiving skills train-
ing one day each week and working the job-site four days per week.
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against four of the unions with the worst records of racial discrimination.32
The filing of these complaints started a long period of negotiations be-
tween the unions involved and the government which culminated in settle-
ment agreements with all of the unions. The community kept itself abreast
of these negotiations, frequently made suggestions to the Department of Jus-
tice, and even had some of the mechanisms of the Newark Plan written into
the consent decrees.
88
The consent decrees against the four unions had the effect of softening
all union opposition to the plan. In effect, the fight to keep minorities out
of the unions was now beginning to be more trouble than it was worth.
C. Expanding the Plan
Meanwhile, the community, armed with its successful plan, was in the proc-
ess of negotiating with virtually every major sponsor of construction in the
area. The community successfully negotiated the plan with the Port of New
York and New Jersey Authority, which was building three new airline termi-
nals at Newark Airport. Subsequently the construction at Rutgers Newark,
Essex County College, the Essex County Vocational Skills Center, all con-
struction undertaken by the Newark Board of Education, and any construc-
tion receiving a tax abatement by the City of Newark were covered by the
plan.
D. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance
In February 1972, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance in Wash-
32. United States v. United Ass'n. Local 24, Civil Action No. 444-71 (D.N.J.).
33. The use of the minority community as a monitor and enforcer of a decree of
a federal district court arising out of an action filed by the Department of Justice is
an example of the kind of prestige the Newark Community had developed. The consent
decree between the United States and United Association, Local 24 Apprenticeship
Trade School Committee, and the Mechanical Contractors Association of New
Jersey Essex and Union County Divisions, included the following language:
5. Procedures.
(a) Application for Referral.
Local 24 shall require each person who enters its hiring hall seeking employ-
ment to complete, on the occasion of his first such visit . . . an application
for referral. Such application shall contain . . . a summary of the applicant's
work experience in the plumbing or related trades. If any question arises con-
cerning the applicant's experience, the applicant shall be referred to the Craft
Operator Committee (hereafter COC) which was originally established by the
union, the EUD (the Mechanical Contractor's Association), and the commun-
ity in conjunction with the New Jersey College of Medicine and Dentistry
project. The COC shall determine within two (2) working days whether the
applicant's experience qualifies him for referral.
The COC is also given the power to determine which applicants are qualified for union
membership and when to place applicants in certain advanced apprenticeship categories.
[Vol. 23:443
Newark Plan
ington promulgated their own Newark Plan.3 4 The plan was typical of the
various home-town plans promulgated by OFCC: it was doomed to failure
in the eyes of the community.35 The community of course feared that any
implementation of the OFCC plan would seriously undermine its own plan
on future work. Again the community quickly met with OFCC officials
in Washington. After a strong presentation of the successes of the com-
munity plan, OFCC withdrew its own plan and agreed to allow the com-
munity plan to operate in its stead.
III. DRAFTING THE NEWARK PLAN-
PROBLEMS TO OVERCOME
The Review Council established in 1968 had a mandate to adopt a strong
affirmative action plan which would be an effective incursion into an area
which had traditionally been controlled by the construction unions-the re-
ferral of individuals to construction contractors on the job site. It was de-
cided that the Philadelphia Plan should be used as a model.3 6 The Review
Council, as constituted, had a good deal of expertise in the area of con-
cern. It contained representatives from the general contractors associations,
the State Division of Building and Construction, the contractors compliance
offices of the federal government and the community. The community
representatives were able to draw on their experiences with the unions
through the Minority Group Journeymen Referral Service, the Joint Appren-
ticeship Program, and the New Jersey Contractor Development Office. The
natural starting point for such an inquiry was an examination of the construc-
tion trade unions as they operated in the Greater Newark area. It was
their interest which was most adversely affected by the plan and the most
opposition to the plan was expected from them.
34. 37 Fed. Reg. 3753 (1972).
35. Employment Prac. Guide 1721.
36. The Philadelphia Plan was issued by the Secretary of Labor on June 27, 1969
and became effective on September 29, 1969. It covered six construction trades and
applied to five counties in eastern Pennsylvania. The plan required that federal contracts
and federally assisted construction contracts contain specified language obligating the
contractor and his subcontractors not to discriminate against any employee or applicant
for employment because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. The plan
further required that contractors and subcontractors take affirmative action to ensure
that applicants were employed and employees were treated equally. When the total
estimated cost of the construction project exceeded $500,000 each bidder had to "set
specific goals of minority manpower utilization which meet the definite standard" in-
cluded in the invitation for bids. Predicated upon public hearings, ranges were estab-
lished within which the contractors' minority group employment goals were set: in the
first year, employment was to range between four and nine percent; in the second year
between nine and fifteen percent; in the third year between fifteen and twenty percent;
and in the fourth and last year, between nineteen and twenty-six percent. In the event
of failure to meet goals, contractors were given an opportunity to demonstrate that they
had made every good faith effort to meet their commitments. Id. at 1706.
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A. Newark Construction Unions
In the Greater Newark area the members of the construction unions are
mainly white ethnics. They are largely the descendants of those who had done
construction work since the 1920's and 1930's. At that time such work
was non-union and quite low-paying. Through unionization by able lead-
ership and a conducive political atmosphere, these individuals were able to
organize unions which developed into formidable advocates for the rights
of their memberships.
The bargaining unit in the construction industry is usually determined ac-
cording to two criteria: craft and geography. The craft determination is
done along traditional trade lines,3 7 but the determination of which jobs
ancillary to the performance of that craft shall be included in the bargain-
ing unit varies greatly from one collective bargaining agreement to another.
The geographical size is the function of an almost infinite number of vari-
ables. 8s Suffice it to say that there are no specific NLRB requirements
other than "appropriateness" and, in New Jersey, the size of some construc-
tion crafts may be statewide or larger, while others may not even cover the
boundaries of a small city.
39
Certification gives the union a whole series of rights. Most important
among them are the ability to compel collective bargaining 40 and the right
to be the bargaining representative of the appropriate unit exclusive of
any other union.
41
37. See Rathbun, The Taft-Hartley Act and Craft Unit Bargaining, 59 YALE L.J.
1023, 1034-37 (1950).
38. There are many processes by which a bargaining unit is determined. In the
case of voluntary recognition of a union by an employer there will not be NLRB re-
view. But in all other procedures-stipulation for certification, consent elections, peti-
tion for election upon 30% showing of interest-the NLRB does determine the appropri-
ateness of the unit. The Board will limit such considerations to the petitions before
them and national labor policy. In the case of stipulations for certification and con-
sent elections in a stipulated unit often outside considerations such as community at-
titudes, individuals' preferences and public policy considerations outside labor policy are
not made. In Tidewater Oil Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1966), the Court
held that the NLRB has no discretion to fix the appropriate unit where the parties
(union and employer) have stipulated as to the unit. The Board could review the unit on
the grounds of appropriateness, as measured by labor policy considerations, with such
review limited to the appropriateness of the stipulated bargaining unit.
39. Local 825 of the Operating Engineers covers the whole State of New Jersey
and five counties in New York, while Local 502 of the Laborer's covers only three
small towns in Essex County. See Agreement between International Union of Operat-
ing Engineers Local 825 and Grafton Construction Co. See also Agreement, Laborer's
International Union, Local 502. Some of these smaller unions band together into dis-
trict councils for purposes of collective bargaining.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). Section 7 of the NLRA protects union members in
the exercise of their rights and section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the recognized representative (by
certification or otherwise) of the bargaining unit.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
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As a result, the Review Council decided that any effort to organize a mi-
nority union or to operate outside the established union machinery would be
unsuccessful. The process of de-certification 42 could take years, and an
attempt to completely circumvent the unions would probably produce so
much on-the-job antagonism that no construction could take place.
B. Becoming a Union Member
If one of the basic goals to be achieved by the plan was going to be
union membership by its minority participants, the Review Council sought
to apprise itself of the admission policy of Newark's construction unions
vis-a-vis non-minorities. The laws of supply and demand affect the deci-
sion of a union's membership to admit new applicants. The membership of
any given union have an obvious incentive to keep its ranks small. 43  This
incentive is exacerbated by two factors:
1) Construction is by its nature seasonal. In the industry, ten months of
work is all that most members can expect. The tendency, as a result, is to
keep overall membership down to a number equal to the job expectations
during the leaner months. 2) Unions tend to have a kind of "depression
psychology." Union men always seem to fear that the work will all dry
up in a future year.
These factors also contribute to the high initiation fees for entry into
these unions. 44 The manner in which one becomes a union member is
often cloaked in great secrecy. Even among members in some unions,
how one got his "book" is his own business. But there is a procedure es-
tablished for the training and selection of new union members.
An apprenticeship program is set up by a committee made up of contrac-
tor representatives and union representatives (frequently called the joint
apprenticeship committee). This committee decides if and when an ap-
prenticeship program will open and which of the applicants will be chosen
for it. The program usually lasts for five years, during which an individual
is supposed to get classroom instruction and on-the-job training in all aspects
of the particular trade.4 5 He is paid, while on the job, at a rate which is
42. Pioneer Bus Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962).
43. See Fenton, The Taft-Hartley Act and Union and Control of Hiring-A Critical
Examination, 4 VILL. L. REv. 339 (1959); Sovern, The NLRA and Racial Discrimina-
tion, 62 COL. L. REV. 563, 567 (1962); Note, Unilateral Union Control of Hiring Halls:
The Wrong and the Remedy, 70 YALE L.J. 661 (1961).
44. The initiation fee for Local 11 of the Ironworkers is $800.
45. This period is obviously much longer than necessary and appears designed to
discourage entry into the program. See Levine, The Failure of Apprenticeship Training
in Skilled Manpower Development, 16 LAB. LAw J. 635, 640 (1965).
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some percentage of a journeyman's wage depending upon years of ap-
prenticeship as provided in the collective bargaining agreement. After serv-
ing his apprenticeship period, the membership decides whether to admit
him or not.
Many unions open up their apprenticeship programs very infrequently.
In fact, a very small percentage of the membership of most of Newark's lo-
cals become members via the apprenticeship route. Union membership is
often granted on the basis of one's connections with the union hierarchy.
Traditionally, the relatives of union members are favored. Some contrac-
tors with personal influence can also get individuals placed. It is not rare
in some of the more highly skilled trades for a man completely unfamiliar
with the trade to be placed upon the job at full journeyman wages.
46
There are certain tacit agreements between the contractors and the union re-
garding such practices; the business agent can often arrange the delivery
of a book to the right person with a telephone call.
As a result, the Review Council decided that some training mechanism
completely independent of union control would have to be adopted. The
plan would require that trainees be placed on the job and trained by union
journeymen in a manner similar to the apprenticeship program, but control
over the choice of trainees and the program as a whole would have to re-
main vested in the Review Council. Finally, a method to guarantee train-
ees union membership after their training period had to be devised.
C. The Union's Position in Today's Construction Industry
In terms of its mandate, perhaps the most important information the
Review Council needed was an understanding of the relationship that ex-
isted between the unions and the contractors, and how this relationship
gave the unions exclusive rights to determine who shall work.
47
In New Jersey today, virtually every large construction contractor, with
the exception of home builders, is a union contractor. There are several
reasons for this.
1. Unions control the primary source of skilled construction labor.
Large contractors need a continuous reliable source of journeymen. Men
are hired only for as long as needed and then are discharged, at which
time they await a new referral.
46. In spite of collective bargaining agreements setting the apprentice-journeymen
ratio at one to five, many trades never send an apprentice to a job. See statistics
cited in Levine, supra note 45, at 641.
47. The law supports the complete control over membership vested in the unions.
Parish v. Legion, 450 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1971); Moynahan v. Pari-Mutuel Employees
Guild, 317 F.2d 209 (9th Cir., 1963).
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2. Many manufacturers will not guarantee their products unless they are
installed by qualified workmen and the 6ne acceptable test of qualification
is journeyman status given by a union.
3. Non-construction workers such as material-men and truck drivers
who are themselves unionized can be uncooperative with a non-union con-
tractor.
4. Large construction jobs often have many tiers of sub-contractors on
the site at the same time. Cooperation between these contractors and their
work gangs is a must for smooth daily on-the-job performance. Union
workmen generally will not cooperate with non-union workmen. The
presence of non-union workers could result in 8(b) (7) proviso picket-
ing,48 job-sabotage resulting in equipment and materials damage and threat-
ened work slow-downs.
5. Any job which makes use of federal monies must comply with the
Davis-Bacon Act,49 which requires the "going rate" be paid to the em-
ployees. The Secretary of Labor determines the "going rate" based on the col-
lective bargaining agreement in the area.50 This Act forces non-union con-
tractors to pay union rates on government work and lessens the incentive
to be non-union. Practically speaking, therefore, most large contractors
must be union contractors. A contractor achieves this status by signing a
collective bargaining agreement with the unions who supply the kind of
craftsmen he needs.
One of the most important sections of such an agreement is the union
security clause which sets out how and where the contractor shall find his
workers and whether those workers shall be required to join the union. A
typical collective bargaining agreement contains the following language:
A Union shall establish and maintain at its own expense an
appropriate registration facility, also known as a hiring hall, for
qualified applicants available for employment as journeymen.
The employer shall hire qualified journeymen by calling the Union.
Whenever an employer requires a journeyman, he shall notify the
Local Union office. In the event there are no journeymen regis-
tered on the out-of-work list or the union is unable to refer to the
Employer the requested number of journeymen within forty-eight
hours, the Employer shall be entitled to seek his journeymen from
any other source.51
48. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1970) does not bar informational picketing that does
not seek recognition of the union by the non-union employer. See Coney, Affirmative
Action Dents the National Labor Policy, 10 DUQUESNE L. REV. 1, 32 (1971) [herein-
after cited as Coney].
49. 40 U.S.C. § 276a (1970).
50. United States v. Binghamton Construction Co., 347 U.S. 171 (1954). See also
29 C.F.R. § 5.0-.32 (1973).
51. Collective Bargaining Agreement between Mechanical Contractors Association of
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This type of job security provision, referred to as a "hiring hall clause,"
is one of the most jealously guarded provisions in the collective bargaining
agreement. It commits the contractor to using the union hiring hal
52
as sole source of labor. This vests the union with almost aboslute control
over who shall be entitled to do construction work in a particular craft in a
given geographical area."8 The only exceptions, of course, are states that
have enacted "right to work" statutes. 54  In all other jurisdictions section
8(a)(3) makes lawful union security clauses.
Sections 8(a) (3) and (8) (b) (2) of Taft-Hartley Act prohibit discrimi-
nation based on union membership in hiring or referral.5 5 But still, much
of the referral out of union halls is done in an illegal fashion, especily in
the winter months when work is not plentiful. When work is more plenti-
ful non-union members are referred by way of a permit procedure, 56 but
even then the jobs which involve the most overtime, the least travel, and
the most desirable overall work situation go to members.
57
Membership also entitles one to union fringe benefits which include a
medical and hospital plan, strike benefits, and a pension plan, among
many others.58 Individuals who work on permit [non-union members]
New Jersey, Inc., Essex and Union County Divison and Plumbers and Steamfitters, Lo-
cal 475 at 9-10.
52. The use of hiring halls as an exclusive source of labor was approved in Team-
sters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961). See also Mountain Pacific Chapter
of the General Contractors, 119 N.L.R.B. 883 (1957), enj'd, 270 F.2d 425 (9th Cir.
1959).
53. Kovarsky, Union Security, Hiring Halls, Right to Work Laws and the Supreme
Court, 15 LAB. L.J. 659, 660 (1964). See also § 8(f) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(f) (1970).
54. § 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970). See NLRB v.
National Maritime Union, 175 F.2d 686 (2nd Cir. 1949), and cases cited therein,
rejecting the argument that statutory authorization of contracts which require employees
to join a particular labor union within thirty days of their being hired as a condition
of continued employment does not violate the first amendment rights of those employees
to associate or disassociate as they see fit.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970) as amended, and 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970).
56. A permit is a card or slip of paper distributed by the business agent of a union
to non-union individuals during periods of high employment when there are more jobs
than union craftsmen. The permit is given to the contractor and informs him that
the permit carrier is sanctioned by the union for purposes of temporary employment.
57. Sovern, supra note 43, at 571 states that "some union halls continue to treat job
openings as plums to be bestowed on deserving union men .... ." See also M. SOVERN,
LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 166 (1966) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL
RESTRAINTS].
58. Most collective bargaining agreements set up a number of trust funds to be ad-
ministered by the unions and the contractors. A contractor is required to pay a speci-
fied amount into each fund for each man hour worked. For example, Local 825 of
the Operating Engineers has the following funds: the supplemented Unemployment
Benefit Fund, which requires the contractor to contribute 10 percent of gross wages
and can be drawn upon by union members during layoffs; the welfare fund, requiring
t contribution of 7 percent of gross wages and serves as a strike benefit fund; the
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contribute to all of these union funds on an equal basis with members.59
Workers referred out on permit pay for the benefits of the membership.
Membership also entitles an individual to subtle on-the-job favors, frequently
from the shop steward who acts as the union's representative at a
particular job-site. He often assists the contractor in assigning men to par-
ticular jobs, and he also resolves disputes which may arise with on-the-job
contractor. Such cooperation is necessary to insure essential labor stabil-
ity on the job.
Based upon these factors, the Review Council realized that any plan
designed to deal with this kind of strength would have to have very ef-
fective sanctions or the Review Council would be unable to enforce its posi-
tion. In addition, the Review Council realized that the treatment of indi-
viduals referred to the job under the plan must be a valid subject of in-
quiry under the plan. The Council also sought to devise a method whereby
it could refer individuals directly to the job without violating the hiring
hall provisions of the collective bargaining agreements.
The type of plan being contemplated by the Review Council directly
obligated the contractor; the union was obligated only indirectly through
the employer with whom they had a collective bargaining agreement.
But the union is often in a better bargaining position than the employer. 00
The Review Council, therefore, gave long consideration to the question of
pension fund, requiring 7 percent of gross wages; the industry advancement fund re-
quiring .3 percent contribution. Violation of any of the above by the contractor re-
quires an amount equal to the default to be paid into the union sick fund. See Agree-
ment, Operating Eng'rs Local 825, supra note 32. The Electrical Workers Local 52
requires 10% of gross wages to pay industrial employees as vacation and holiday allow-
ance.
59. Collective bargaining agreements provide for a procedure for repayment of these
monies, but the repayment may be unavailable for a number of years and as a practical
matter the repayment usually does not occur.
60. Coney at 32. The inequality in bargaining power between local unions and indi-
vidual contractors leads to many unusual contractual provisions. For example: most
unions have negotiated for the creation of certain jobs. At times, overtime provisions
required high rates of pay for the shop steward, even if he were not present on the
job. Construction collective bargaining agreements are meticulously precise even about
how much time workers are to be allotted to clean tools. E.g., the collective bargaining
agreement of Local 52 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, at 14
requires "when thirty (30) working journeymen are employed . . . there shall be one
General Foreman, one Foreman and two sub-foremen." Local 825 of the Operating
Engineers requires the presence of an oiler for each machine on the job; also, if five
or more employees are present on the job, the contractor must hire a Lead Engineer and
a Foreman engineer.
Other unusual provisions may include getting paid for travel to and from work if
the job is outside the jurisdiction, the requirement that the employer supply all tools
(Local 52 of the Electrical Workers), or the requirement that the employer supply
raincoats and boats to his employees (Local 502 of the Laborers Union).
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whether a plan which operates only indirectly on the unions through the
contractor could succeed. A search for a method which would operate di-
rectly against the union was unsuccessful, however. It was decided to in-
clude as much language obligating the union as possible with an eye to
convincing a court of its legality afterwards.
Given the rather formidable position of the skilled craft unions, it is
not difficult to see that attempts at integration by minorities have been dif-
ficult. The reputation of these unions in the black community is "whites
only." Thus, the minority worker who attempts to get admitted does so
with the realization that the trade has established a reputation of antagon-
ism toward him.
Typically, the minority applicant reports on the site for employment
only to be told that he must get a union book or permit. When he seeks a
permit from the union he is told that if he gets a job on the site he will
get a permit or possibly a book. In the alternative, he may be told that
it is a union job and only union members can be employed. If he in-
quires about how to become a member, he is told to submit an application
for entry into an apprenticeship program and that if an apprenticeship pro-
gram opens up in a year or so, he will be called. He quickly realizes
that he has no chance of entering this kind of system, and seeks employ-
ment elsewhere. As a result, the Review Council realized that an ambi-
tious recruiting mechanism would have to be set up to convince the skep-
tical minority that perhaps now times had changed and the possibility of
finding work in the construction trades was a reality.
IV. THE PLAN ITSELF 61
The plan which the Review Council finally created took the form of a con-
tractual obligation between the builder and the general contractor. When
the job specifications are published with an invitation for bids, the plan
is included in the job specifications. Just as the general contractor is
obligated to use the materials set out in the job specifications, he simi-
larly is obligated to comply with the requirements of affirmative action.
The general contractor is responsible for the compliance of his subcon-
tractors and must include the plan in his subcontracts.
The contractor must submit a projected manpower utilization table bro-
ken down by month and by trade. This document gives the Review Council
an idea of what numbers of minorities it should recruit to comply with the
plan. The contractor must specify what goals he can meet, and his goals
61. The latest version of the Newark Plan, now in effect on all building undertaken
by the Newark Board of Education, is printed in full in the Appendix, pp. 482-90 infra.
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must fall within the ranges specified in the plan. The contractor must
also submit a statement from each union he expects to use on the job. If
any union fails to comply, the contractor must state in detail the efforts
he made to obtain the statement and what reasons the union gave for re-
fusing. The contractor is then responsible for the submission of all these
documents by his subcontractors.
The bid documents relating to affirmative action are reviewed by the
Review Council and approved or disapproved depending upon compli-
ance. If approved by the Review Council, the contracts are signed in
the normal course.
By signing the contract, the contractor commits himself to a plan which is
largely administered by a Review Council. 62 The contractor is required to
have a full-time compliance officer on the site to review compliance, and
he frequently acts as the contractor's spokesman. The Review Council is
represented on the job daily by the site-liaison officer who receives his salary
from Newark Construction Trades Training Corporation (NCTTC). This
individual also prepares weekly reports for the Review Council and tries to
speak personally to all minorities on the job pursuant to the plan. The
prompt implementation of the Review Council decisions is the result of
high level representation from the respective parties.
The plan requires that the contractor make a good faith effort to com-
ply with the plan. The element of good faith is to be determined by the
Review Council, but in no event shall union opposition constitute good faith.
The plan treats the contractor as the employer of his union employees.
It assumes that his mandate on the site will be obeyed. The Council is not
ignorant of the tremendous power of the unions, but takes the position
that their power shall not deter the implementation of the plan.
63
With respect to journeymen, the plan requires that between thirty and
thirty-seven percent be members of minority groups. The contractor must
inform his union of the requirement and seek referrals that comply with
the goals. If the union fails to refer what is required, the Review Council
is contacted, which in turn contacts the Minority Group Journeymen Re-
ferral Service. The MGJRS then refers a minority journeyman to the
job. He first goes to the union hall with the site liaison officer to be proc-
essed and then is referred to the job. If the union refuses to refer, he
62. See p. 456 supra.
63. In litigation involving the plan, the Review Council is characterized as an ad-
ministrative agency vested by the various governmental finding agencies with the power
to review compliance. In addition, it is peopled by contractors, union people and the
like. The court, as a result, should give great deference to its determinations. See,
e.g., Borden Co. v. Freeman, 256 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.J. 1966).
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goes to the job anyway and the contractor must hire. Naturally, if the Re-
view Council and MGJRS can find no minority journeymen to fill the va-
cancies, the contractor has demonstrated the requisite good faith and then
may fill the job with whomever he pleases.
With respect to apprentices, the contractor is required to hire fifty per-
cent minorities. This provision has been virtually inoperable because the
use of apprentices on the site is totally under union discretion and the
unions have not seen fit to utilize many apprentices on the job.
The most important requirement of the plan is the training program. The
plan defines two different types of trainees: "advanced trainee" and
"basic trainee." An advanced trainee is a worker who has experience
and skills used in construction work but lacks the skills to be qualified
as a journeyman. The Review Council or one of its subcommittees makes
this classification. The community included the classification of advanced
trainees to deal with a large number of minorities who had rather spor-
adically worked in a trade over a period of time, possessed many of the
skills of a journeyman, and needed perhaps only a year of training to be-
come a journeyman. Such individuals would be unwilling to enter a trade
at the lowest rank in light of their experience.
A basic trainee is an applicant for employment who does not possess
the qualifications for entrance into an apprenticeship program but dem-
onstrates an interest in pursuing a craft in the construction industry.
The contractor is required to employ one trainee for every five journey-
men on the job. This trainee works side-by-side with the journeyman on
the job four days per week. On the fifth day, the trainee attends skills
training class at the NCTTC. He is evaluated daily on the job by the con-
tractor, and his wages are based upon the apprenticeship scale. A sub-
committee of the Review Council periodically evaluates the progress of the
trainee and sets his wages accordingly. 64 The unions are required to admit
into membership individuals employed under this plan. And despite the
bitter opposition from the unions in Joyce, the court approved the plan as
written. With respect to all other conditions of employment on the job, the
collective bargaining agreement controls.
The plan as revised has a number of sanctions written into it which can
effectuate its requirements in the face of opposition. When the plan is
being violated it calls for the issuance of an alert notice. If the alleged
violation has not been cleared up within seven days a violation notice is
64. The services of the NCTIC are maintained by the Review Council to recruit can-
didates for the training program in addition to providing the actual training. NCITC
employees also do much of the Review Council's administrative work.
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issued. The contractor in question then has the right to a hearing before
the Review Council with all the procedural safeguards required by due
process. If the Review Council still finds non-compliance and an unwilling-
ness to comply, it recommends one of a number of sanctions to the
builder. 5
The fact that the Review Council only recommends the imposition of
sanctions raises a very important problem. When attempting to have a
builder include the plan in his job specifications, the proponents of the
plan must make quite clear that they expect the Council recommendation of
sanctions to be backed up by the sponsor. The commitment must come
from the highest possible level of the building agency and the proponents
must be satisfied that the commitment is made in good faith.06
The sanctions include the following:
1) The withholding of contract payments;
2) The termination or suspension of the contract;
3) Damages caused by non-compliance, actual or liquidated. Liquidated
damages shall be assessed by the builder on behalf of the minority individ-
ual injured by the non-compliance of the contractor or subcontractor. It
shall be assessed at the rate of $500 per individual plus the full amount
of back pay due the individual from date of referral. This shall not be
deemed to exclude any other damages which the individual can demon-
strate as a result of the non-compliance.
4) Requiring the developer to enforce his obligations under his contract
with contractors and subcontractors, either by suit at law or in equity or by
arbitration, whichever is appropriate;
5) Commencement of an action at law or in equity or proceeding in arbi-
tration as third-party beneficiary. Further, the non-complying contractor
shall indemnify the builder for any damages it may be found liable for
vis-a-vis any of the other contractors or subcontractors on the job or any
other third party as a result of the imposition of the above sanctions.
The final provision gives the community the power as third-party benefi-
ciary to enforce the plan if a builder fails to live up to his commitment.
65. If a union persisted in its opposition to the plan, it can be argued that the Re-
view Council or the job sponsor could enjoin the union opposition under a tortious in-
terference of contract theory. See UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958). The union
could also be brought before the NLRB for an unfair labor practices action. See
generally Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 181 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Iowa,
1960). But no builder yet approached has been willing to grant complete authority
to the Review Council to impose sanctions.
66. There is some question whether a governmental body is legally empowered to
delegate the right to terminate contracts to some independent body.
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V. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE
APPLICABLE LAW
At one time or another, the community made use of virtually every law
and every administrative agency which concerns itself with employment dis-
crimination. In developing the Newark Plan they sought to create a scheme
which provided an effective remedy to the problems posed in Newark and
to concern themselves afterward with the exigencies of the law. As stated,
the Philadelphia Plan was used as a preliminary model and the attor-
neys involved attempted to fashion the plan so that it would conform to
Executive Order 11,246.
A. Executive Order 11,24667
Executive Order 11,24668 is the culmination of a whole series of Executive
Orders69 designed to eliminate racial discrimination in employment per-
formed under government contract.7 0 It requires that in all contracts in-
67. There is a large number of good articles dealing with Exec. Order 11,246 and
its various implementations. See, e.g., Coney, Affirmative Action Dents the National
Labor Policy, 10 DUQUESNE L. REV. 1 (1971); Symposium Employment Discrimination
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HAxv. L. REV. 1275 (1971); Comment,
Is Section 1981 Modified by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?, 1970 DuKE
L.J. 1223; Comment, Race Quotas, 8 HARV. Crv. RicHrs--Civ. LiB. L. REv. 128
(1973); Note, The Legality of the "Revised Philadelphia Plan," 30 Mo. L. REV. 114
(1970); Note, The Affirmative Action Requirement of Executive Order 11,246 and
Its Effect on Government Contractors, Unions and Minority Workers, 32 MONT. L.
REV. 249 (1971); Note, The Philadelphia Plan, 45 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 678
(1970); Note, Executive Order 11,246: Anti-Discrimination Obligations in Government
Contracts, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 590 (1969); Note, California's Approach to Racial
Discrimination in Employment: The Complaint Process v. Voluntary Affirmative
Action, 5 U. OF SAN FRAN. L. REV. 404 (1971).
68. 3 C.F.R. 174 (Supp. 1973). The order was amended by Executive Or-
der 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14303 (1967) to include a prohibition against sex dis-
crimination.
69. The principal orders which have dealt with anti-discrimination obligations are:
Exec. Order 8802, 3 CFR 957 (1938-43 Comp.); Exec. Order 10,308, 3 CFR 837
(1949-53 Comp.); Exec. Order 10,479, 3 CFR 961 (1949-53 Comp.); Exec. Order
10,557, 19 Fed. Reg. 5655 (1954); Exec. Order 10,925, 3 CFR 448 (1959-63 Comp.);
Exec. Order 11,114, 3 CFR 774 (1959-63 Comp.). The only order currently applicable
is Exec. Order 11,246.
70. It is quite possible that the promulgation of Executive Order 11,246 is unneces-
sary. The Executive Branch has broad discretion in determining the recipients of fed-
eral contracts and under what conditions contracts will be granted:
Like private individuals and businesses, the Government enjoys the unre-
stricted power to produce its own supplies to determine those with whom it will
deal, and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make needed pur-
chases. Acting through its agents as it must of necessity, the Government
may for the purpose of keeping its own house in order lay down guide posts
by which its agents are to proceed in the procurement of supplies, and which
create duties to the Government alone. Thus assumedly under the general
right to contract, the federal government can effectuate national policy in fed-
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volving federal assistance "[t]he contractor . ..take affirmative action to
insure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during
employment without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or national
origin."'71 The term "affirmative action" has been interpreted by OFCC to
mean not only insuring present nondiscrimination, but also correcting the
results of past discrimination and developing programs which broaden mi-
nority group participation in the contractor's operation. 72  It may include
any action which might prove necessary to achieve the result of social
equality in the employer's job structure. 73
Judge Werner agreed with the OFCC interpretation in Contractors As-
sociation of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor.7
4
The heartbeat of "affirmative action" is the policy of developing
programs which shall provide in detail for specific steps to guar-
antee equal employment opportunity keyed to the problems and
needs of members of the minority groups, including when there
are deficiencies, the development of specific goals and timeta-
bles for the prompt achievement of full and equal employment
opportunity. 75
Part I of the Order is specifically applicable to construction contracts
paid for in whole or in part with funds obtained from the Federal
Government or borrowed on the credit of the Federal Government
pursuant to such grant, contract, loan, insurance or guarantee,
undertaken pursuant to any Federal program involving such grant,
contract, loan, insurance or guarantee. 76
The regulations issued pursuant to the Order exempt contracts for less
than $10,000. 77
The Order requires that the contractor (1) state in all advertisements that
consideration for employment will be without regard to race, creed, color
or national origin; (2) advise his unions of his commitments under the
Order; (3) comply with the Order and the rules and regulations promul-
gated pursuant thereto; (4) keep records and permit access to his books
eral contracts absent any contrary indication from the legislature.
See generally Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940); Contractors Ass'n
of E. Penn. v. Sec. of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3rd Cir. 1971), aff'g, 311 F. Supp. 1002
(E.D. Pa. 1970).
71. Section 202(1) of Exec. Order 11,246, as amended, supra note 68.
72. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40(a), (b)(1)-(3) (1968).
73. See Remarks by James E. Jones, Assoc. Solicitor, Labor Relations, Civil Rights
Division, United States Department of Labor, BNA Daily Labor Report No. 1555, Au-
gust 8, 1968 at D-1 - D-4.
74. 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 159 (3rd Cir. 1971).
75. 311 F. Supp. at 1009.
76. § 301 of Exec. Order 11,246, as amended, supra note 68.
77. 41 C.F.R. § 60 (1970); see also Coney, at 7-17 for a detailed discussion of
how this exemption applies to various sub-contracts and procurement contracts,
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and records for the purpose of ascertaining compliance; and (5) include
these obligations in subcontracts and purchase orders.78 The regulations
broaden the above requirements to include the requirement that the con-
tractor and the government agency develop a written affirmative action pro-
gram after identifying problem areas in minority employment and analyz-
ing opportunities for utilizing minority group personnel. 79  The various lo-
cal plans have been developed pursuant to this regulation.
B. The Hometown Plans
In February 1970,80 the Department of Labor announced its intention to
mandate specific home town plans on all federally funded construction in
eighteen cities where the under-utilization of minorities in the skilled trades
seemed most acute in order to implement the Executive Order.8 ' In the
cities selected, OFCC encouraged local representatives of minority groups,
unions and contractors to develop their own voluntary minority group area-
wide plan. If such plans were not developed on a local level, OFCC would
mandate its own plan. The advantage in this mechanism is that the plan de-
veloped covers all construction in the greater metropolitan area in question,
whether federally funded or not.82
The various government funding agencies are primarily responsible for
the enforcement of the Executive Order. As a practical matter, all the Or-
der requires is that the funding agency include the language of the Order
in its funding document and see to it that the recipient of the funds in-
cludes the language in all of his contracts. The OFCC, 83 along with
the appropriate contracting agency, has the power to impose sanctions
for non-compliance with the Order. 4  Of the various sanctions available
78. § 202 of Exec. Order 11,246, as amended, 3 C.F.R. 174 (Supp. 1973). See also
Note, The Affirmative Action Requirement of Executive Order 11,246 and Its Effect
on Government Contractors, Unions and Minority Workers, 32 MONT. L. REV. 249
(1971).
79. 41 C.F.R. § 60 (1968). See also Note, Executive Order 11,246; Anti-Discrimi-
nation Obligation in Government Contracts, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 590, 593 (1969), explain-
ing that plans at Lockheed Aircraft Corp. and Burlington Industries Inc. were the fore-
runners of this regulation.
80. Department of Labor News Release, 11,027, February 9, 1970.
81. The cities involved were Atlanta, Boston, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Denver, Detroit,
Houston, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Miami, Milwaukee, Newark, New
Orleans, New York, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, Seattle, and St. Louis.
82. 1 EPD f 1718. Successful negotiation of home-town plans have occurred in
Chicago, Pittsburgh, Boston, and Newark.
83. Overall supervisory authority is conferred upon the Secretary of Labor. The
Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) was created in 1965 and the Secretary
delegated his authority under the Executive Order to it in 1968. See § 201, Exec.
Order 11,246 supra note 68; and Department of Labor, Secretary's Order NO. 2665, 31
Fed. Reg. 6221 (1966).
84. See Z 209(a), Exec. Order 11,246,
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to OFCC or the contracting agency,85 only cancellation,80 suspension or ter-
mination of the contract, and debarment87 from future contracts with the
agency involved provide a sufficiently effective impetus to insure compli-
ance.
While these sanctions are certainly effective enough to force compliance,
the complete failure on the part of OFCC88 to utilize them has in a sense
rendered the Executive Order useless.80 As of the end of 1970 only seven
debarment actions were instituted; only three actually got to the hearing
stage and no sanctions were imposed at all.90 Although a hearing is re-
quired prior to the imposition of sanctions, "OFCC and the contracting agen-
cies are ill-equipped to make use of the hearing mechanism." 91  It also
now appears that the enforcement power of the federal agencies is exclu-
sive. 9
2
The question of sanctions points up another weakness in the Order. Con-
tract termination and all the difficulties that go along with it tend to make
either the federal funding agency or the job sponsor unwilling to impose
such absolute sanctions upon a contractor who, in the face of vehement
union opposition, fails to comply. The various federal funding agencies
85. Other sanctions include publication of the names of non-compliers and reporting
the non-compliers to the Department of Justice and the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission. § 209(a) through (4), Order 11,246.
86. Id. § 209(a)(5).
87. Id. § 209(a)(6).
88. In a memo of Sept. 15, 1972 directed to all department heads, James Hodgson,
Secretary of Labor, said that goals based on a percentage of an area population were
not to be used for determining the hiring of women and minorities. Herbert Hill, La-
bor Director of the NAACP charged "that the Nixon administration had abandoned the
Philadelphia Plan and other compliance measures in the construction industry ....
N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1972, at 26, col. 4.
89. N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1972, at 1, col. 7, reported that a survey of the regional
offices of the offices of Federal Contract Compliance indicated that the staff people
were demoralized by what they perceived to be a lack of commitment on the part of
the Administration and senior Labor Department official to back enforcement efforts
of Exec. Order 11,246. Virtually every job now continues in spite of a lack of com-
pliance. See also statements of Herbert Hill, NAACP labor director, N.Y. Times, July
7, 1972, at 18, col. 1.
90. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EF-
FORT 68-69 (1971). See also Hadnott v. Laird, 463 F.2d 304, 309 n.13 (D.C. Cir.
1972). See also 463 F.2d at 313 (dissenting opinion). HEW however has debarred
a contractor under Exec. Order 11,246; In re Eagley Products, Inc.
91. U.S. COMMISSION ON CivIu RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIvIL Riowrs ENFORCEMENT EF-
FORT 69 (1971).
92. Hadnott v. Laird, 463 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1972), a!f'g, 317 F. Supp. 379
(D.D.C. 1970). But see a number of interesting theories in Comment, Equal Employ-
ment Opportunities and Government Contracting: Three Theories for Obtaining Judi-
cial Review of Executive Order No. 11,246 Determinations, 1972 Wisc. L. REV. 133.
See also Farkas v. Texas Instruments Inc., 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967); Farmer
v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1964); Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268
F. Supp. 83 (SD. Ohio, 1967),
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who are "primarily responsible" for the compliance with the provision of
the Order, are usually more concerned with the progress of the construc-
tion than of the affirmative action plan. As a result there has been vir-
tually no enforcement at that level.
The Executive Order also ignores the fact that the composition of
the employment force for the contractor is dictated almost entirely by the
union with whom he has an exclusive hiring hall collective bargaining
agreement. Instead of having Part III of Executive Order 11,246 apply to
the construction craft unions, the Order puts obligations on the contrac-
tors only.9 3  But there is no reason, for example, why the federal govern-
ment could not require that, on government contracts, unions having
collective bargaining agreements with contractors contracting with sponsors
that receive federal funds for construction must have a certain mem-
bership of minorities if hearings established a pattern of exclusion by those
unions.94 Sanctions could include fines, liquidated damages, decertifica-
tion by the NLRB, or termination of the collective bargaining agreement
as against the effectuation of national policy.
This would impose sanctions on the guilty party. Under the present sys-
tem, the contractor is put in the unenviable position of attempting to get
his union to depart from its jealously guarded prerogative of having ex-
clusive control over job referrals9 5
C. Judicial Decisions Affecting Executive Order 11,246
The case law surrounding the Executive Order, however, indicates that it can
be an effective measure for integrating the construction trades. In a num-
ber of cases the courts have upheld the Order and the various plans prom-
93. U.S. COMMISSION OF CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 90, at 47. Nor does the
order force a union to accept any equal employment obligations although the Secretary
of Labor is directed to use his best efforts to cause a labor union performing work
for a contractor to cooperate in implementing the affirmative action plan. See § 207,
Exec. Order 11,246, supra note 68.
94. Judge Fisher's frank assertion in Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284, 1291
(D.N.J. 1970) makes this clear.
The unions here involved are for the most part responsible for supplying to
the contractors the qualified personnel needed for the Medical School project;
therefore, in any matter that deals with the regulation of this work force the
unions must be proper parties. To rule otherwise would defeat the intention of
the Exec. Order 11,246, in that the Government could bind the contractors to
affirmative action yet this would be meaningless as the contractors could con-
tract away this obligation through collective bargaining agreements with the
unions. In order to enforce affirmative action then, the unions as controllers
of the work force are proper parties.
95. See note 47 supra. Most construction contractors depend almost exclusively




ulgated pursuant to it. 96 The reasoning of these cases can be summarized as
follows: the United States Government, under its procurement power, has
broad discretion to impose conditions upon those choosing to contract with
it or those who intend to finance their project with federal monies. The
Executive Order is authorized, or a least not forbidden, by Congress and is
thus a valid exercise of executive authority. The particular requirements
in each of the various plans before the various courts are not unreasonable
in light of the hearings held prior to promulgation. The various con-
tractors and unions had an opportunity to present their evidence at that
time, and therefore there is no violation of due process. The placing of
minorities on the various jobs is neither unconstitutional nor in opposition
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The goals represent not a
preference, but a remedy of a past wrong.97 Goals are mere projections
of what a particular contractor must make a good faith effort to achieve.
His good faith will be reviewed by the courts if necessary. Seniority sys-
tems and union security clauses in the various collective bargaining agree-
ments are not a bar to such plans, but are superseded to the extent to
which they conflict with the plan. The various unions involved shall not
interfere with the operation of this valid contractual obligation between the
contractor and his sponsor.
Joyce v. McCrane,98 which approved the Newark Plan, expands these
holdings by declaring that remedies against the unions themselves are ap-
propriate. Joyce represents a major breakthrough in the law surrounding
Executive Order 11,246 by holding that any union with a collective bargain-
ing agreement with a contractor at the site of the New Jersey College of
Medicine and Dentistry must admit to union membership any minority jour-
neyman referred out to the job pursuant to the Plan. The court comes
to that conclusion by stating the reality of the situation: the Plan con-
cerns jobs and "the unions here involved are for the most part responsible
for supplying to the contractors the qualified personnel needed for the
. . . project; therefore, in any matter that deals with the regulation of this
work force the unions must be proper parties." Hearings had made find-
ings (upon which the Plan was based) which showed exclusionary prac-
tices by the unions, and the Plan as promulgated was a reasonable admin-
istrative response to those practices. 99 The decision also approved an
96. See So. Illinois Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 327 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D. Ill. 1971);
Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1970); Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v.
Sec. of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.
1971); Weiner v. Cuyahoga Comm. Coll. Dist., - Ohio -, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970).
97. See pp. 470-71 infra for a more expansive discussion of the legality of goals.
98. 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1970).
99. Borden Co. v. Freeman, 256 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.J. 1966), af 'd, 369 F.2d 404
(3rd Cir. 1966).
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extensive training program, apprenticeship goals and a rather powerful
Review Council which monitors the progress of the Plan. The court ap-
proved the Plan in full as a reasonable response to the exclusionary practice
found in Newark at the OFCC hearings. All the union arguments about
security clauses and usurpation of union powers'00 were unpersuasive to the
court in light of the findings and the authority of the Order.
D. The Legality of the Goals' 011
In spite of the amount of political controversy which racial goals in em-
ployment plans has caused, 10 2 the case law supports the use of goals in
achieving equal opportunity for minorities. It is clear that the federal
courts are empowered under Title VII, upon finding of racial discrimina-
tion, to require the discriminating defendant to remedy the situation by
achieving a specified percentage of minority employees within a specified
time.' 08 The same rationale applies when the executive branch of the
government holds hearings to find the degree of under-utilization of mi-
norities and then sets goals to remedy the past under-utilization.
The court in Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency104 made
clear that the state may legitimately recognize race in exercising its affir-
mative duty to correct racial imbalance. Indeed, it may be argued that
failure on the part of the executive branch to take such action would vio-
late the fifth and the fourteenth amendments. The fourteenth amend-
ment prohibits not only overtly discriminatory state action, but also the
acquiescence of public officials in the discrimination of the private sector
when it contracts with the federal government. 05 The same standard of
conduct binds the federal government under the fifth amendment.' 06 Eth-
ridge v. Rhodes'07 enjoined the entry of contracts by the state when the
contracting companies satisfied their employment needs through unions that
100. 320 F. Supp. at 1291-92.
101. In the past few years a large number of excellent articles have been written
on the subject of the legality of goals in Affirmative Action plans. Comment Race
Quotas, 8 HAxv. Crv. RIGHTs-CIv. LrB. L. REv. 128 (1973); Note, Constitutionality
of Remedial Minority Preference in Employment, 56 MINN. L. REV. 842 (1972);
Title VII and the Quota System-A New Approach to a Belabored Problem, 4 RUT.
CAM. L. REV. 113 (1972); The Constitutionality of Benign Quotas, 40 TENN. L. REV. 55
(1972).
102. See N.Y. Times, August 12, 1972, at 1, col. 1, for the candidates' positions
during the 1972 presidential campaign.
103. See Castro v. Bleecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher,
452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Iron Workers Local 86, 443 F.2d
544 (9th Cir. 1971); Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir.
1969).
104. 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
105. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Simpkins v.
Moses Cone Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
106. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
107. 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
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practiced racial discrimination. Todd v. Joint Apprentice Committee'"8 ap-
plied the same rationale to the federal government:
The defendant agencies in practice and in effect are permitting
the union and the Joint Committee to practice racial discrimina-
tion and by so doing if not directly at least indirectly are deny-
ing plaintiffs their constitutional rights.' 0 9
The same argument can be made making use of 42 U.S.C. section 1981 and
the thirteenth amendment. 110
E. The Inadequacy of Judicial Enforcement of Minority
Employment Rights
The Newark community made use of various judicial remedies against the
unions and contractors on an ad hoc basis, but rejected the use of these
remedies as an overall solution to employment discrimination in the con-
struction trades. Initially, there is a paucity of plaintiffs. In order to be-
come a plaintiff against a construction union, a member of a minority group
must enter a world which he views as hostile. If he applies for membership
in a union or for employment at the job-site he must be able to distinguish
the various non-discriminatory reasons for refusing his application from
those that are discriminatory and proscribed by law. If he decides that the
reason for refusal was discriminatory, he must decide whether to attempt to
vindicate his rights through the legal machinery. In a lawsuit a minority
plaintiff seeks to have a court order a defendant employer to hire him, after
the defendant has made it clear that the plaintiff is undesirable in the de-
fendant's eyes. A plaintiff who has been subjected to such discrimination,
however, usually is no longer interested in employment with the discrimina-
tory defendant. Furthermore, the possibility of collecting money damages
sometime in the distant future is no real incentive to bring legal action,
especially when coupled with the belief that legal assistance is not avail-
able."'
Once litigation is filed the court must deal with very complicated facts in
finding discrimination. The discrimination may exist in the psychological
testing of job applicants. The discrimination may exist half-way between
the referral union and the on-site contractor. The court in turn must dis-
tinguish the various acceptable excuses for not placing the applicant from
those that are unacceptable and make out a case of racial bias. Frequently,
highly sophisticated experts must find that a test is not job related. In
108. 223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Il. 1963), vac. as moot, 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 917 (1964).
109. 223 F. Supp. at 22.
110. See pp. 473-74 infra.
111. SMITH, JUSTiCE AND THE PooR 31-34 (1967).
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addition, the selection and training of apprentices is extremely difficult to
trace. Often, in order to develop one's case, it is necessary to depose
many members of a union to find out how each became a union member-
a very costly proposition. Also the remedy which the judicial approach
does provide is usually not immediate. The minority applicant for em-
ployment is most frequently unemployed. He is seeking employment
because of an immediate need for money. A procedure which does not
promise an immediate remedy simply does not meet his needs. Thus
the judicial approach to the problem is by its nature seriatim: it may or
may not provide the remedy necessary to solve the problem, and the
remedy which it does contain is too slow to meet the plaintiff's needs.
F. The Title VII Remedy
The benefit of the Title VII remedy, at least in its initial stages, is that the
charging party can initiate the action at no financial cost to himself. How-
ever, the procedural morass which follows has caused victims of racial dis-
crimination to lose their rights rather than to vindicate them.112 First,
the charging party must file his complaint with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of accrual."13  He must
have initially filed with the state civil rights enforcement agency-or a
similar agency if one exists." 4 The state agency must attempt to conciliate
112. EEOC, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, indi-
cates that 47,331 actionable charges were fixed during the fiscal year and that 726
case were successfully settled. At the time the report was written, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (Supp. II 1972), had been
in effect for only three months and EEOC had filed no lawsuits. See EPO, Report 39,
(Supp. ed., Aug. 23, 1973).
A failure by EEOC to conciliate the matter is regarded by many victims of discrimi-
nation as the end of the matter. LEGAL RESTRAINTS 74.
113. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42
U.S.C. 2000e-5(e) (Supp. 11 1972). If the complainant is in a jurisdiction which does
have a state administrative agency to process complaints of employment discrimination,
then the complainant may file his complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.
Prior to the passage of the 1972 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, victims
of employment discrimination had to file their complaints within 210 days if in a juris-
diction which has such a state administrative agency or within 90 days in a jurisdiction
that does not have such a law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-05(d) (1970).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-05(b) (Supp. II 1972). See Love v. Pullman Co., 404
U.S. 522 (1972). Deferral to the proper state agency has been held to be a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite to the bringing of a suit in a federal district court. See EEOC
v. Union Bank, 408 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1969); Electrical Workers, Local 5 v. EEOC,
398 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1969).
Senator Humphrey of Minnesota, one of the floor managers in the Senate of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, explained the policy favoring deferral to the states of employ-
ment discrimination complaints as follows: "[T]he basic philosophy of the bill is that
• . . whenever possible, the problems dealt with by the bill should be resolved locally
and voluntarily." 110 CONG. RECORD 12,707 (1964).
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the matter within the wholly inadequate period of sixty days. 115 Needless
to say, the efforts of the state division are usually unsuccessful. 1 6 Then
the complainant is referred to the EEOC, which has another 120 days to
attempt to conciliate the matter. 117 The conciliation procedure was intended
to reach voluntary compliance in this very sensitive area," 8 but settlement
is rarely reached in conciliation; employers and unions are often advised by
their attorneys that regardless of the outcome of the two conciliation pro-
ceedings, a law suit may follow. 119
After the conciliation, in which the charging party may be called in on a
number of occasions, the still unsuccessful complainant is sent his ninety
day notice to sue. 120 Generally the victim regards the notice to sue as the
failure of the EEOC to remedy his problem and thus the end of the matter.' 2'
Congress amended Title VII in 1972 to allow the EEOC independent stand-
ing to initiate a civil action following the termination of unsuccessful con-
ciliation efforts. EEOC's record in this respect has been less than exem-
plary. 122 Too often the passage of time and the confusion created by
having two or more agencies attempt to resolve the issue has led to a failure
of enforcement.
G. The 42 U.S.C. 1981 Remedy1
2 3
Given the fact that delay is frequently equivalent to a loss of rights and
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-05(c) (Supp. I 1972).
116. See generally Crosslin v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. 442 F.2d 1028 (9th
Cir. 1970); Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1109, 1215-16 (1971). See also
Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-05(b) (Supp. 1 1972).
118. LEGAL RESTRAINTS, supra note 57, at 80. See also statements of Senator Hum-
phrey, supra note 114.
119. Developments in the Law, supra note 116, at 1215. Prior to the 1972 Amend-
ments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the complainant had only thirty
days following the failure of conciliation within which to bring suit. It was at this
stage that most victims of racial discrimination forfeited their rights. Working under
a thirty day statute of limitations, attorneys also had great difficulties in meeting the
deadlines; and even if the deadline were met, the final product may have been less than
the attorney's best effort.
120. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f) (Supp. II 1972).
Failure to file suit within the prescribed period after receipt of notice from the EEOC
has been held to be a jurisdictional bar to the maintenance of a civil action by the
aggrieved complainant. See Goodman v. City Products Corp., Ben Franklin Div., 425
F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1970) and Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Company, 402 F.2d 357
(7th Cir. 1968).
121. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II 1972). Under the 1972 amendments, the
Attorney General of the United States is empowered to bring a civil action in cases
where a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision is the alleged
discriminator. Id.
122. See note 112 supra.
123. See generally Larson, The Development of § 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Dis-
crimination in Private Employment, 7 HAv. J. Civ. RiOHTs-Civ. Lm. L. REV. 56 (1972).
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that minorities tend to eschew officialdom, the remedy contained in 42 U.S.C.
section 1981124 is far superior to the Title VII remedy. The resurrection
of the statute, originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
was signalled by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Jones v. Mayer.125
The court there held that section 1982, also part of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, provided an effective remedy against private discrimination in hous-
ing. Since Jones, a number of courts presented with the issue of employ-
ment discrimination against blacks have held such discrimination violative
of the section 1981 right "to make and enforce contracts."'
126
The issue of whether this section requires exhaustion of the EEOC proce-
dure has not been resolved as yet, but the weight of authority appears to be
in favor of treating section 1981 as a wholly independent remedy.127  This
presents the possibility of quick injunctive relief for a victim of racial dis-
crimination,128 which cuts through much of the time consuming adminis-
trative procedure required under Title VII.
VI. REMEDIES UNDER THE LABOR STATUTES
A. The Duty of Fair Representation
129
In the case of Steele v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co."3o the Supreme
Court interpreted the provisions of the Railway Labor Act as barring labor
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides as follows:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses,
and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
125. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Jones held that discrimination by private individuals,
as distinguished from discrimination under color of state law, was violative of the
Constitution, resurrecting the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982
and declared them constitutional under the thirteenth amendment.
126. Brady v. Bristol-Meyers Inc., 459 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1972); Caldwell v.
Nat'l Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971); Young v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Co.,
438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Bourdreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co.,
437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th
Cir. 1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Workers of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476
(7th Cir. 1971).
127. Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc. 459 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1972); Caldwell v.
Nat'l Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971); Young v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Co.,
438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971).
128. Caldwell v. Nat'l Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir. 1971); Young
v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757, 764 (3d Cir. 1971). Both of these cases
noted that the issuance of preliminary relief under .§ 1981 might induce alleged
discriminators to make use of the conciliation process under Title VII.
129. See Herring, The "Fair Representation" Doctrine: An Effective Weapon
Against Union Racial Discrimination, 24 MD. L. REV. 113 (1964) and Cox, The Duty
of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151 (1957).
130. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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organizations from failing to represent fairly the interests of all members of
the bargaining unit while enjoying the privileges of an exclusive bargaining
agreement. The Court stated:
So long as a labor union assumes to act as the statutory represen-
tative of a craft, it cannot rightly refuse to perform the duty,
which is inseparable from the power of representation conferred
upon it, to represent the entire membership of the craft. While
the statute does not deny to such a bargaining labor organiza-
tion the right to determine eligibility to its membership, it does
require the union, in collective bargaining and in making con-
tracts with the carrier, to represent nonunion or minority union
members of the craft without hostile discrimination, fairly, impar-
tially and in good faith.
131
The duty of fair representation prevents a union from causing discrimina-
tion in discharges, 132 job classifications,'33 or other conditions of employ-
ment 134 from unfair handling of grievances'"1 to accepting a discriminatory
contract.1 36  The duty applies equally to such discrimination under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.' 37 The Courts and the NLRB have concurrent
jurisdiction to vindicate the rights of individuals claiming a breach of the
duty. 138
The Steele standard requires that the interest of non-union members be
represented on an equal basis with union members. Since 8(b)(1)1
39
makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to pervert the
exercise of section 7 rights, 140 it may be inferred that any union activity
based on race which adversely affects the rights of any member to self-
organization, to bargain collectively, and engage in concerted activity is pro-
scribed by this standard.
The meaning of the doctrine as applied to the construction industry is
not clear. Since the determinants of the bargaining unit are craft and geog-
raphy,14' assumedly all non-union craftsmen in a geographical area are enti-
131. Id. at 204.
132. Rolax v. Atlantic Coastline R.R., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1950).
133. Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
134. United Rubber Workers, Local 12, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964).
135. Conley v. Gebson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
136. Central Ga. Ry v. Jones, 229 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
846 (1956).
137. Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
138. Voca v. Sipes, 380 U.S. 171 (1966); United Rubber Workers, Local 12 v.
NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962),
enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970). See Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248
(1944).
140. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
141. See p. 454 and notes 37-39 supra.
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tied to fair representation by the union which represents their trade. The
determination of craft and who has achieved the requisite skill to be so
represented remain open questions. As a practical matter, there is little
incentive to represent non-members since they are barred from electing
union officials who do the bargaining, from attending meetings, and
from voting on issues which may affect them.142  The issue in Newark has
been limited to an attempt to eliminate discriminatory referrals based on
union membership. As yet, the doctrine has not been utilized to attempt to
remedy discrimination in the choice of apprentices or union admissions
policies. 1
43
B. Section 8 of The Taft-Hartley Act1
44
As earlier stated, in addition to exclusive hiring halls, one of the more for-
midable obstacles to integration in the construction trade is the ability of a
union to require union membership as a condition of continued employ-
ment after thirty days from the commencement of employment. Such
agreements are sanctioned by section 8(a) (3)1 4"' with the following qualifi-
cation:
Provided further that no employer shall justify any discrimination
against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization if
he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was
not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions
generally applicable to other members.
section 8(b)(2) places a corollary duty upon the union not to encourage an
employer to violate section 8(a)(3). Thus, it can be argued,' 46 that in an
area of high minority population but low minority membership in the un-
ions, the employer is not bound by that part of the collective bargaining
agreement which requires union membership of his employees.' 47  This,
linked to the requirement that unions not discriminate in referrals on the
basis of union membership, could make membership in a trade union en-
tirely irrelevant to the hiring practices of a union contractor.'
48
142. Rauh, Civil Rights and Liberties and Labor Unions, 8 LAB. L.J. 874, 875
(1957).
143. See LEGAL RESTRAINTS 177-203.
144. All references to statutory sections are to the National Labor Relations Act.
145. See Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
146. See LEGAL RESTRAINTS 164-67. See also Sovern, supra note 43, at 567-77.
147. See Parham v. Southeastern Bell, 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
148. In the case of United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C.
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969), Judge J. Skelly Wright found discrimina-
tion by an employer to be a violation of section 8(a)(1). He reasoned that employer
discrimination inhibited the employees' ability to organize under section 7 by setting
the employees of different races against one another. He further reasoned that such
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C. Relief Under the Landrum-Griffin Act 149
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act'50 defines member-
ship in a union as appropriate to "any person who has fulfilled the re-
quirements for membership in such organization . . ."15 and has not with-
drawn or been dismissed or suspended. The courts have in a number of
cases forced labor unions to admit members of brother locals' 52 and to
reinstate suspended members. 153 In the latter situation the court interpre-
ted the definition of member broadly:
This section is not limited to those persons who are recognized
as members by the organization. Instead it provides equal rights
and privileges to any person who has fulfilled the requirements,
i.e., those who are members in substance despite the fact that the
union officials have not performed the ministerial acts necessary
to give formal recognition to a person's status as a member.'5
This broad reading of the statute may serve the needs of minorities who
have practiced the trade for many years, but have never succeeded in ob-
taining a book or who were members of a local at sometime in the past.
However, a number of courts have been unwilling to go so far, looking in-
stead to 29 U.S.C. section 411(2) which states: "nothing herein shall be
construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce
reasonable regulations." Moynahan v. Pari-Mutuel Employees Guild'55 de-
nied relief to a non-union member seeking admission, because he had not
received the favorable vote of two thirds of the current members, stating:
However, legislative history persuasively demonstrates that Con-
gress did not intend Section 3(o) to limit the previously recog-
nized rights of unions to choose their members.' 56
However, even the broad reading of the Act would seem to give no relief to
a minority seeking entry into the apprenticeship program.
D. NLRB Decertification Remedy
Hughes Tool'57 involved the failure of a union to consider the griev-
discrimination "creates in its victims an apathy or docility which inhibits them from
asserting their [section 71 rights" against their employers. Id. at 1135.
149. See Hickey, The Bill of Rights of Union Members, 48 GEO. L.J. 226 (1959);
Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARv.
L. REV. 851 (1960); Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform
Act of 1959, 58 MICH. L. REV. 819 (1960).
150. 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970).
151. 29 U.S.C. § 402(o) (1970).
152. Hughes v. Ironworkers Local 11, 287 F.2d 810 (3d Cir. 1961).
153. Axelrod v. Stoltz, 246 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
154. Id. at 539.
155. 317 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1963).
156. Id. at 210. See also Parish v. Legion, 450 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1971).
157. 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
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ance of a minority based on racial discrimination. The NLRB held that
such action constituted an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(1)
(A).158 But more importantly the Board cited Shelley v. Kraemer 59 in
stating:
Specifically we hold that the Board cannot validly render aid under
Section 9 of the Act to a labor organization which discriminates
racially when acting as a statutory bargaining agent.'1 0
As for a remedy, the Board makes it clear that it considers decertification
an appropriate remedy for discriminatory treatment. 1 1 And perhaps more
important for community groups, 162 claimants against a union for its racially
discriminatory practices could assumedly intervene' 6 3 in virtually any NLRB
proceeding in which the discriminating union is involved and force the
Board to either decertify the union or to simply deny the union enforce-
ment of any rights it might have under the National Labor Relations Act.'
6 4
VII. CONCLUSION
The process just described has lasted five years. Many of the par-
ticipants in the process have been with it throughout. The development of
such a plan requires a great deal of effort and its implementation requires
constant supervision. However, recognizing these facts, groups in other
cities, wishing to tackle the problem of discrimination in the construction
trades can apply the lessons of the Newark experiences to their own efforts.
There are a number of elements which are essential to the implementa-
tion of such a plan:
A. Participants in the Plan. The plan should be a cooperative effort be-
tween the community, the various levels of government, the job sponsors,
the contractors and eventually the unions. Each of these constituencies
should sit on the Review Council.
1. The Community. The term community has been used on two
levels throughout this article. 165
a. At one level, it was the actual drafters and implementers of the
158. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970). See note 138 supra.
159. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
160. 147 N.L.R.B. at 1577.
161. Pioneer Bus Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1963).
162. There appears to be no reason why government agencies charged with enforc-
ing civil rights laws could not also intervene under 29 C.F.R. § 102.29 (Supp. 1973).
163. 29 C.F.R. § 102.29 (Supp. 1973).
164. See WELLINGTON, THE CONSTITUTION, THE LABOR UNION AND GOVERNMENT
ACTION (1961); Weiss, Federal Remedies for Racial Discrimination by Labor Unions,
50 GEO. L.J. 457 (1962).
165. See note 7 supra.
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plan. This group, numbering five or six, should have a thorough know-
ledge of construction. They must be indigenous to the community. Among
them should be a lawyer and also an individual with at least a modicum of
political clout. Initially, at least, each of these individuals should have an
outside source of income, but also be free to dedicate a substantial amount
of time to implementing the plan. These are the individuals who should
eventually be the community's representatives on the Review Council.
b. At the other level, a broad coalition of virtually every civic, religious,
political, and self-help organization in the city should be developed. They
can be kept abreast of development through meetings and newsletters. They
should be organized to back up the efforts of the implementing group. Their
role is to act in an ad hoc way in matters where the influence of such a large
political coalition is necessary-such as attempting to obtain government ap-
proval of the plan, or to get funding or to convince a particular job spon-
sor to implement the plan.
2. The Various Levels of Government. Government can play an essen-
tial role in implementing the plan on two levels:
a. Essentially the fifth and fourteenth amendments require that no level
of government should countenance racial discrimination in a construction
project in which they are even minimally involved. This includes fund-
ing, clearance of land, guarantees, tax abatement and the like. Thus,
even without Executive Order 11,246, any level of government can condition
their participation in a construction project upon compliance with a plan
which creates a remedy for past discrimination. In such a role, however,
the governmental body must be willing to improve sanctions, including stop-
ping construction for non-compliance.
b. The other role that government can play is that of a funding source.
The plan works best if it has independant administrative, training and out-
reach mechanisms and each of these require funding.
3. The Job Sponsor. If the government participant is unwilling to com-
mit itself to the plan, it is still possible to achieve the desired result by at-
tempting to get the commitment of the builder, or the recipient of the gov-
ernment assistance. It can further be argued that even a purely private
builder receiving no governmental subsidy whatsoever is bound by Title VII
and 42 U.S.C. section 1981, not to fund racial discrimination, and thus he
should attempt to remedy the results of past discrimination by imposing the
plan on his project.
4. The Contractors. The plan operates by obligating the General Con-
tractor to oversee that the make-up of his work force complies with the
plan. Thus, the backing of a general contractors association or a mechani-
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cal contractors association can solve many problems. Their expertise is of
great assistance in drafting the plan; their word can frequently convince a
job sponsor to accept the plan; they can convince their membership of the
wisdom of the plan; and they can often smooth out problems in the daily
implementation of the plan.
5. The Unions. Although in Newark the unions have not been overly co-
operative until recently, their cooperation, or at least lack of opposition
can certainly make the whole process run more smoothly. Even the mini-
mal support of just one union business agent can be very valuable. The
unions are certainly the experts in every thing the plan is attempting to do.
At a minimum, however, care should be taken not to alienate the unions
and they should be enacted to participate in the plan at every level.
B. Provisions of the Plan
1. Findings. The legal posture of an affirmative action plan is
that it is a remedy for a past wrong. In order for a plan to be legally
valid, it must be a response to the findings of some governmental ad-
ministrative body. These findings should be made pursuant to hearings.
Unions and contractors should be given notice of the hearings and an
opportunity to present their side of the case. The administrative agency
should make formal findings of fact.
2. Goals. The plan should include a percentage requirement of mi-
norities on a per hour basis for each trade and job category. The per-
centages should be based upon the findings. The percentages should vary
as to journeymen, apprentices and trainees. The importance of the journey-
men goals depends upon the number of non-union minority journeymen in
a given area. The importance of apprentice goals depends upon the fre-
quency with which the joint apprenticeship committees in a given area
open up apprenticeship programs. The trainee goals are most impor-
tant because these are the individuals who will be recruited by the plan
and sent to the job.
3. Union Membership. The intent of affirmative action is to inte-
grate the construction unions. Without a union membership provision, the
participants will work only for as long as the plan is operative and then
will have to find work elsewhere.
4. A Community-Dominated Review Council. The Review Council
oversees the daily operation of the plan. It should meet at least bi-weekly.
It should resolve complaints from any participant of the plan and see that
all provisions are being complied with. The various representatives sitting
on the Review Council can frequently resolve difficulties without recourse to
[Vol. 23:443
Newark Plan
any of the formal proceedings in the plan. Representatives of the general
contractor should be present at each meeting to report on job progress.
C. Funding. In Newark, there has been funding for two district func-
tions of the Plan: administration and training.
1. Administration of the Plan. The size of the administrative appara-
tus is largely dependent upon the size and number of jobs the Review
Council must oversee. This office should employ a sufficient number of
site liaison officers, so that one officer can visit each job at least once
a day.166 The administrative apparatus should also see to it that as much
job continuity as possible is achieved. As one job slows down and the
number of minorities is reduced, the minority worker should be placed
elsewhere. The administrative apparatus should also serve the function of
recruiting trainees, apprentices, and journeymen for the Review Council
to refer to the job.
2. Training. Under the plan training contemplates skills and remedial
training one day out of five in school outside of the union structure. The
State of New Jersey and the federal government have funded a training
school specifically for trainees under the Newark Plan. Since this is
expensive other cities should explore the viability of having the training done
in local high schools, colleges or vocational educational facilities.
D. Monitoring and Sanctions. If the plan is operating smoothly, the im-
position of sanctions should not be necessary. However, in this difficult
area, the power of the Review Council will be dependant upon the per-
ceived willingness of the job sponsor to impose the ultimate sanctions of
terminating the general contractor's contract and stopping the job. The pro-
ponents of the plan should make this perfectly clear to the job sponsor
before he adopts the plan initially. The proponents of the plan should sat-
isfy themselves that should the Review Council unsuccessfully exhaust
its procedures for obtaining compliance and recommend sanctions to the
job sponsor, the sponsor will honor the recommendation and apply the
necessary sanctions.
166. The site liaison officer accompanies the beginning trainee to the job site and
reports to the Review Council on his progress. He acts in a sense as the eyes and
ears of the Review Council and attends Review Council meetings.
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I. GENERAL EMPLOYMENT POLICIES
The employment practices of contractors and sub-contractors on the project
which is the subject-matter of this contract must meet the requirements of the
laws of the State of New Jersey and the United States of America respecting
equal employment opportunity.
In order to meet these requirements, a contractor working on any part
of the project under a contract(s) or subcontract(s) exceeding $10,000
shall be required to meet the conditions and provisions included herein
which are incorporated into and made part of each contract(s) and sub-
contract(s).
II. PREAMBLE
The failure, historically, to employ, and the exclusion of, minorities on
construction projects has resulted in the necessity for the development of an
affirmative action program aimed at insuring that equal employment op-
portunities are afforded to all, regardless of sex, race, color, religion or na-
tional origin. Contractors, therefore, are required to exert a positive "good
faith effort" in order to satisfy the requirements of this contract to insure
such equal employment opportunity.
III. FINDINGS
The Office of Federal Contract Compliance, (OFCC), of the U.S. De-
partment of Labor held hearings in March, 1970 on the racial composition of
the skilled trades in the Greater Newark Area. While some progress has
been made as a result of vigorous enforcement of affirmative action plans,
the findings of facts made by the OFCC are essentially true at this time and
the Board adopts them as their own.
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There have been unique problems in enforcing the non-discrimination
and affirmative action requirements of State Executive Order 21 and Federal
Executive Order 11,246 in the construction industry. Contractors and sub-
contractors must hire a new employee complement for each construction
job, and out of the necessity or convenience, they rely on the construction
craft unions as their prime or sole source for their labor. Collective bar-
gaining agreements and/or established custom between construction con-
tractors and subcontractors and unions frequently provide for, or result in,
exclusive hiring halls; even where the collective bargaining agreement con-
tains no such hiring hall provisions or the custom is not rigid, as a practical
matter, most people working in the construction industry are referred to
contractors by the unions. Because of these hiring arrangements, referral by
a union is a virtual necessity for obtaining employment in union construc-
tion projects, which constitute the bulk of commercial construction. Be-
cause of the exclusionary practices of some labor organizations in Newark,
New Jersey area, there traditionally has been only a small number of mi-
norities employed in the construction trades. These exclusionary practices
include:
(1) Failure to admit minorities into membership.
(2) Failure of the unions to refer minorities for employment, which
has resulted in large measure from granting of priority in referral to
Union members and to persons who have had work experience under
union contracts.
(3) Failure to admit minority group members in apprenticeship pro-
grams.
The Newark city population is estimated at 400,000 persons, of which
over 60 percent are Negroes, and 10 percent Spanish surnamed Americans.
The overall unemployment rate in Newark totals 9.1 percent while minor-
ity unemployment is substantially higher.
Labor force participation rates further illustrate the availability of minori-
ties for employment in Newark. 84.9 percent of all Negro males in New-
ark are included within the labor force as are 82.9 percent of all Spanish sur-
named male Americans.
As to the number of minority persons available for construction work,
the total minority unemployment in the Newark area is approximately
14,000 while approximately 29,000 minority persons are presently under-
employed. Over 1,300 minority persons have already indicated a desire to
work in construction and it is estimated that substantially more would take
advantage of the opportunity if it was freely granted.
It has also been estimated approximately 11,400 construction jobs re-
quiring new manpower will be available by 1975 for an annual average
of 1,900 new jobs, thus, establishing that substantial numbers of minority
persons may be brought into the construction industry without displacing
existing workers.
Thus, members of minority groups constitute a clear majority of the pop-
ulation in Newark, and there are substantial numbers of minorities available
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as construction workers. However, minorities are seriously under-utilized
on construction projects performed in Newark and are hardly represented as
members in certain trade unions which by contract or custom control the
referral of persons for employment in the construction trades in Newark.
Minorities have been excluded as members of construction trade unions
and from apprenticeship programs. For example, according to 1970 statis-
tics, of the major construction trade unions, two had no minority journey-
men members, two more unions representing four trades had less than 1
percent minority journeymen membership, and two more unions had less
than 2 percent minority journeymen membership.
There has also been exclusion of minorities from apprenticeship pro-
grams. Thus, for example, in 1970, three apprenticeship programs re-
ported that they included no minority apprentices, two more covering em-
ployees in five trades included about 3 percent minorities and another about
5 percent.
It is concluded therefor, that the affirmative action program set forth here-
in is necessary to equal employment opportunity on construction sponsored
by the Board of Education of the City of Newark.
IV. DEFINITIONS
For the purpose of the contract, unless the context indicates a different
meaning;
(1) Minority means black, Puerto Rican, or Spanish surname Ameri-
cans.
(2) Review Council is a body to be composed of no less than six minority
members of the Newark community, who are to be appointed by the Board of
Education of Newark, two representatives of the unions and so designated
by them, two representing the interests of the contractors and so designated
by them, and two representatives of the Board of Education and designated
by it.
The Review Council shall review contract bids received by the Board
from all contractors to determine whether the bidder has met the require-
ments of the Affirmative Action Program to insure compliance. It shall,
from time to time, report to the Board of Education and make such recom-
mendations as it deems necessary. The Review Council shall have such
other duties in addition as are described herein.
The Board of Education will consult with the Review Council in the evalu-
ation of documents submitted by bidders before the award of any contract
for the construction of the project for the purpose of determining whether
the bidder has met the requirements of these supplemental conditions.
The Review Council will receive referrals of journeymen from the Minority
Group Journeymen Referral Service, and apprentices from the Joint Appren-
ticeship Program and trainees from the Newark Construction Trades Training
Corporation (defined infra), and shall determine the qualifications and
classify persons as journeymen, advanced trainees, and basic trainees for
the purpose of applying the provisions herein. Individuals shall be deter-
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mined qualified for employment as journeymen, advanced trainees, and
basic trainees solely upon the basis of experience, on-the-job evaluation and,
where necessary, oral or written or performance examinations approved by
the Review Council. No arbitrary method of evaluation measuring quali-
fications other than a person's ability to perform work shall be valid.
(3) The Newark Construction Trades Training Corporation (N.C.T.T.C.)
at 222 Morris Avenue, Newark, New Jersey is a non-profit corporation funded
by the State of New Jersey for the purpose of supplying off-site training to
minority individuals who are receiving on-site training pursuant to the various
affirmative action programs in the Greater Newark Area.
(4) Advanced Trainee is a worker who has experience and skills used
in construction work but lacks the skills to be a qualified journeymen and is
classified by the Review Council, or a subcommittee thereof, as an ad-
vanced trainee.
(5) Basic Trainee is an applicant for employment who does not pos-
sess the qualifications for entrance into an apprenticeship program but dem-
onstrates an interest in pursuing a craft in the construction industry and is
classified by the Review Council, or a subcommittee thereof, as a basic
trainee.
V. CONTRACTOR'S CONTRACTING OBLIGATIONS
The Contractor shall submit to all contractors and subcontractors this Af-
firmative Action Program and shall make said Affirmative Action Pro-
gram a part of his project specifications. He shall require that by submit-
ting a bid, the contractor certifies that he will comply with this plan. In ad-
dition, to be responsive in his bid, the contractor must submit a state-
ment to each union with which he has a collective bargaining agreement
covering workers to be employed on the project, in accordance with para-
graph IV below. Before the award of any subcontract is approved, the
contractor will be required to submit such statement for each sub-contrac-
tor having a collective bargaining covering workers to be employed on said
project, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph III. In either case,
if no such statement has been obtained the contractor will submit documen-
tation of his efforts to obtain such statement, in accordance with the provi-
sions of paragraph IV.
1. The contractor, in hiring for this job, shall make every effort to em-
ploy persons residing within the geographical jurisdiction of the appropriate
union in order to insure that persons employed on the project will be brought
into the permanent construction industry labor force in the area.
2. The contractor shall not discriminate against employees and appli-
cants for employment on the grounds of union membership, or on the
grounds of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
3. Based on the findings made herein, the contractor will make every
good faith effort to meet the following goals of minority journeymen utili-
zation in the performance of his contract, whether or not the work is sub-
contracted.
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4. The goals of this Affirmative Action Program in the selected trades




Trade Description Within these ranges
Bricklayers 30-35 percent
Carpenters 30-35 percent
Cement Finishers 30-35 percent
Electricians 34-37 percent











Sheetmetal Workers 30-33 percent
Sprinkler Fitters 30-35 percent
On the attached form [Sub-Appendix B] the contractor will submit with
his bid his goals of minority journeymen utilization in the trades, specified
above in the performance of the contract. These goals shall be applicable
whether or not the work is subcontracted.
5. The contractor will make every good faith effort to reach a goal
of 50 percent minority group apprentices on the job in each trade listed in
subparagraph 4 of this ARTICLE III in which apprentices are employed,
and shall hold each of his subcontractors to this requirement.
6. The contractor will cooperate with the Review Council in providing
on-site training for persons employed on the construction site and will pro-
vide on-site opportunities to basic and advanced trainees referred to him
by the Review Council. Each trainee will be excused from work for one
day each week in order to receive off-site training at N.C.T.T.C. The
Review Council shall retain the Newark Construction Trades Training Cor-
poration for the purpose of recruiting and supplying off-site training to mi-
nority trainees referred to in paragraph 11 (3) and paragraph II (4). The
Review Council is also empowered to approve equivalent training programs
from another source.
7. The contractor shall not be required to employ more trainees than
the number permissable under the apprentices to journeymen employment
ratio specified in the applicable collective bargaining agreement, or if
there is no applicable agreement the established ratio in the trade, or by
industry usage in the area. Provided: No ratio requiring the employment
of more than five (5) journeymen for each apprentice shall be applicable
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where the employment of minority group apprentices and trainees is neces-
sary in order to permit the contractor to meet obligations under these Sup-
plemental Conditions.
8. Criteria for Measuring Good Faith
(a) The contractor will consider for employment as journeymen, basic
trainees and advanced trainees, persons referred to him by the Minority
Group Journeymen Referral Service, the Joint Apprenticeship Program, and
the Newark Construction Trades Training Corporation, who have been classi-
fied by the Review Council. If the contractor does not employ any person
so referred, he shall submit a written explanation by close of day to the
Review Council.
(b) The collective bargaining arguments between the various contractors
and sub-contractors and their various unions shall remain in force and effect
except to the extent that they are inconsistent with the terms of the affirm-
ative action plan. Where required by custom or agreement, the conrac-
tor shall send referrals from the Review Council to the union registrator
for referral, or to the apprenticeship program for admission, pursuant to
such agreement or arrangement. The unions will however have no right of
rejection over Review Council referrals.
(c) The contractor will notify the developer and the Review Council
whenever he has reason to believe that a union with which he has a hiring
hall or referral arrangement or an apprenticeship program engages in such
referral, membership, admission, or other practices as will substantially im-
pede the contractor in his efforts to meet his Affirmative Action obligations
under these Supplemental Conditions.
(d) A contractor shall not be deemed to have exercised good faith un-
der this agreement solely because of union opposition, even if the unions
threaten a work stoppage because of the implementation of this plan. It
shall be encumbant upon the contractor as employer to see to it that re-
ferrals under this plan are treated fairly by the unions and their members.
9. The contractors (and each subcontractor whose contract(s) exceeds
$10,000), shall develop and submit a Manning Table. This document shall
identify his estimated manpower requirements for the duration of the job
broken down by trade and month. The manning of the job shall be related
to this document which shall be brought up to date as required but not less
than once monthly.
10. The contractor shall submit copies of his collective bargaining
agreements covering workers to be employed on the project, and copies of
such bargaining agreements of each subcontractor.
11. The contractor shall designate a principal officer of his firm to be
the Affirmative Action Officer who shall be responsible for administering the
Affirmative Action Program detailed herein. This officer shall meet regu-
larly or as may be required with all contractors, the Review Council, and the
Board to insure attainment of the goals set forth herein and the implemen-
tation of the training program.
12. The contractors, and subcontractors agree that the Board and the
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community as represented by the Minority Construction Coalition, who pro-
posed this plan to the Board, shall be a third-party beneficiary with respect
to the Affirmative Action provisions of all contracts relating to this project4
They further agree that as third-party beneficiary, the Board and/or the
Community may take such legal action to enforce the provisions referred to
as it may deem necessary, without the approval or consent of the contrac-
tors, or subcontractors.
VI. UNION STATEMENT
The Contractor shall require that when the contractor has a referral
agreement or arrangement with a union covering workers to be employed
on this project, he shall submit with his bid a statement similar to Sub-Appen-
dix A, signed by an authorized union official, in which the union agrees as
follows:
1. The union will take such action as may be necessary with respect to
the referral and the employment of minority group persons in order to en-
able the contractor to meet his obligations under these Supplemental Con-
ditions.
2. The union will cooperate with the Review Council in providing on-
site training on the construction site.
3. Minority group journeymen employed by the contractor shall be ad-
mitted to union membership within the time limits contained in the appli-
cable collective bargaining agreements, union constitutions, and by-laws.
The contractor will promptly notify the developer and the Review Coun-
cil of any failure of the union to comply with its statement. If a union has
refused to sign the statement described above, the contractor will document
his efforts to obtain such statement, including a description with the reason
by the union for not signing such statement, and submit such documenta-
tion, together with his bid. A bid shall be unresponsive if it is unaccompanied
either by an acceptable union statement or by documentation as to why such
statement could not be obtained.
In addition, the award of a subcontract will not be approved if such con-
tractor has not submitted such an acceptable union statement or an explana-
tion of the failure to obtain such a statement.
The failure of the union to sign the statement described above does not ex-
cuse the contractor from his obligations to comply with the conditions and
provisions of the Affirmative Action Program set forth herein.
VII. SUBCONTRACTORS
The contractors shall require that each prime contractor is responsible
for the performance of his subcontractors for the implementation of the
aforementioned equal employment requirements during the performance of
the contract. Whenever the contractor subcontracts a portion of the work
on this project the subcontract shall bind the subcontractor to the obligations
contained in these Supplemental Conditions to the full extent as if he were
the contractor. Furthermore, the contractor must include a provision in all
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contracts with subcontractors to insure compliance with all other conditions
included herein, as well as with the N.J. Executive Order 21, and N.J.S.A
§§ 10.2-1 through 10.2-4, and Executive Order 11,246.
25).
VIII. NON-DISCRIMINATION
The commitments of the contractor hereunder are for the purpose of satis-
fying his affirmative action obligation under these Supplemental Conditions
and is not intended, and shall not be used, to discriminate on the basis of
race, color, or national origin against any qualified applicant or employee.
IX. COMPLIANCE
In the event of failure by a contractor to meet his minority manpower com-
mitments under these Supplemental Conditions, he shall be given an oppor-
tunity to demonstrate that he has made every good faith effort to meet his
commitments. In any proceeding which such good faith is in issue, all of
the actions of the contractor in seeking to comply with these requirements
shall be reviewed and evaluated by the Review Council. Compliance with
these conditions will be monitored by a full-time compliance officer employed
the Board of Education.
(1) The Review Council will issue a written ALERT NOTICE to a con-
tractor and appropriate unions whenever, in its opinion, a breach of these
conditions appears to be developing.
(2) If the ALERT NOTICE is not removed by a correction of the defi-
ciencies within the time specified in the notice, the compliance officer shall
follow up the ALERT NOTICE by issuing a written VIOLATION NO-
TICE. Upon issuance of such notice, the contractor will have seven (7)
working days to remove the violation. If the violation has not been removed
within the period, the Review Council will inform the Board.
(3) Either or both notices may be removed if the contractor meets his
obligations under these Supplemental Conditions or if he presents a satisfac-
tory explanation in writing as to why such compliance is impractical, or im-
possible.
(4) Compliance will be monitored by the Review Council or one of its
members acting on its behalf.
(5) Failure to satisfactorily remove a violation notice shall be heard by
the Review Council and a determination by the Review Council that the con-
tractor is not in compliance with this plan shall result in a recommendation
of sanctions by the Review Council to the Board. Such recommendation shall
be accepted by the Board unless it is deemed unreasonable. Such sanctions
may include any or all of the following:
(1) the withholding of contract payments
(2) the termination or suspension of the contract
(3) damages cause by non-compliance: actual or liquidated. Liqui-
dated damages shall be assessed by the Board on behalf of the minority
individual injured by the non-compliance of the contractor or sub-
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contractor. It shall be assessed at the rate of $500.00 per individual
plus the full amount of back pay due to the individual from date of
referral. This shall not be deemed to exclude any other damages which
the individual can demonstrate as a result of the non-compliance.
(4) requiring the developer to enforce his obligations under his con-
tract with contractors and subcontractors, either by suit at law or in
equity or arbitration, whichever is appropriate.
(5) commencement of an action at law or in equity or proceeding
in arbitration as third-party beneficiary. Further the non-complying
contractor shall indemnify the Board for any damages it may be
found liable for vis A vis any of the other contractors or subcontractors




The Union, being a party to a collective bargaining
agreement covering workers to be employed on the project, in order to as-
sure equal employment opportunity on such project, agrees as follows:
1. It will cooperate with the Review Council, the contractors with whom
it maintains a collective bargaining agreement and the Board with regard to
the full implementation of the terms of the Supplemental General Conditions
Relating to Affirmative Action for Equal Employment Opportunity at the
project (hereinafter referred to as Supplemental Conditions).
2. It will refrain from any practice or policy which has as its purpose or
effect impeding the contractor or subcontractor and developer in meeting his
Affirmative Action obligations arising out of the developer's contract with the
Board.
3. It will take such action as may be necessary with respect to the refer-
ral and employment of minority group persons in order to enable the con-
tractor, subcontractor and developer to meet their obligations under these
Supplemental Conditions.
4. It will cooperate with the Review Council in providing on-site training.
5. It will admit to membership all minority group journeymen em-
ployed by the contractor within the time limits prescribed in the applicable




Trade Goal (in percent)
Bricklayers
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Carpenters
Cement Finishers
Electricians
Elevator Constructors
Glaziers
Insulators
Ironworkers
Lathers
Operating Engineers
Painters
Plasterers
Plumbers; Pipefitters; Steamfitters
Roofers
Sheetmetal Workers
Sprinkler Fitters
